Rebel integration in conflict settlements: past lessons and the prospects of MILF reintegration by Estrera, Allen Van L. & Lai, Justin Wei Liang
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-12
Rebel integration in conflict settlements: past
lessons and the prospects of MILF reintegration
Estrera, Allen Van L.; Lai, Justin Wei Liang
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56913
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
REBEL INTEGRATION IN CONFLICT SETTLEMENTS: 





Allen Van L. Estrera 




Thesis Advisor:  Douglas Borer 
Co-Advisor: Jesse Hammond 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
REBEL INTEGRATION IN CONFLICT SETTLEMENTS: PAST LESSONS 
AND THE PROSPECTS OF MILF REINTEGRATION 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Allen Van L. Estrera and Justin Wei Liang Lai
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     




MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis examines the rebel reintegration programs of the peace agreement between 
the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF). The study involves a broad analysis of lessons learned in previous rebel integration programs 
and an in-depth evaluation of successful and failed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) programs in selected conflict settlement cases. The case studies include the civil war 
settlements in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone as well as the peace accord between the 
Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front. The analyses of these cases are used to 
assess the policy direction of the current rebel integration program with the largest and the last 
remaining secessionist group in the Philippines—MILF. The study also develops a prognosis about 
future problems and opportunities in the implementation of the rebel reintegration program specified in 
the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB), which was a product of the peace accord 
entered between the GRP and MILF. Though the CAB presents an all-inclusive peace agreement that 
suggests a likelihood of sustainable peace, its DDR program follows a totally different path of 
reintegrating the rebels, making it a determining factor in the outcome of the peace deal. This study 
determines the issues and prospects of the MILF reintegration program that will aid in formulating policy 
interventions to increase the prospect of implementation success. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, disarmament, 




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
REBEL INTEGRATION IN CONFLICT SETTLEMENTS: PAST LESSONS AND 
THE PROSPECTS OF MILF REINTEGRATION 
 
 
Allen Van L. Estrera 
Lieutenant Colonel, Philippine Army 
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1999 
 
 
Justin Wei Liang Lai 
Major, Republic of Singapore Navy 
B.S., University of Western Australia, 2008 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 






















Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv 




This thesis examines the rebel reintegration programs of the peace 
agreement between the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The study involves a broad analysis of 
lessons learned in previous rebel integration programs and an in-depth evaluation of 
successful and failed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs 
in selected conflict settlement cases. The case studies include the civil war 
settlements in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone as well as the peace accord 
between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front. The 
analyses of these cases are used to assess the policy direction of the current rebel 
integration program with the largest and the last remaining secessionist group in the 
Philippines—MILF. The study also develops a prognosis about future problems and 
opportunities in the implementation of the rebel reintegration program specified in the 
Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB), which was a product of the 
peace accord entered between the GRP and MILF. Though the CAB presents an all-
inclusive peace agreement that suggests a likelihood of sustainable peace, its DDR 
program follows a totally different path of reintegrating the rebels, making it a 
determining factor in the outcome of the peace deal. This study determines the 
issues and prospects of the MILF reintegration program that will aid in formulating 
policy interventions to increase the prospect of implementation success. 
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A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The Muslim population residing in the south of the Philippines has been at war 
periodically for more than 400 years.1 It has persisted through the Spanish occupation, 
U.S. colonization of the Philippines, and now the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP).2 The GRP has tried to integrate the Muslim minority with the rest of 
the Philippines; to that end, the GRP has encouraged resettlement of non-Muslim 
Filipinos with the Muslims in the south.3 However, the Muslim minority has always 
believed that it should have a homogenous Islamic government or total autonomy, which 
is paramount to its religion.4 The GRP did not agree to such a demand as it would have 
led to separation; this situation ignited the latest Moro insurgency.5 
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) engaged the GRP in armed conflicts 
in a bid to liberate the Bangsamoro (Moro nation).6 In the process, the MNLF gained 
control of areas around Cotabato City and its airport.7 Eventually, Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi intervened and mediated the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, signed 
between the GRP and the MNLF.8 The agreement stipulated the establishment of an 
“autonomous government, a judicial system for Sharia Law, and the observance of a 
                                                 
1 Dennis Bryce Fowler, “The Moro Problem: An Historical Perspective” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1985), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/21452. 
2 Fowler, “The Moro Problem.” 
3 Fowler, 15. 
4 Fowler, 15. 
5 Fowler, 15. 
6 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the 
Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
7 McKenna. 
8 “The Tripoli Agreement,” Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), accessed May 5, 2017, 
http://mnlfnet.com/The_Tripoli.htm. 
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ceasefire.”9 Following this agreement, in 1989, the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) was established.10 However, of the 13 provinces and nine cities, 
only the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi agreed to be 
part of the ARMM.11 This agreement brought about a separation within the MNLF of a 
group of officers led by Hashim Salamat, who believed in having independence over 
autonomy.12 Salamat eventually formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and 
continued armed conflict with the GRP.13 The GRP continually tried to negotiate to bring 
an end to the Moro insurgency, but none of its efforts had any traction to achieve peace 
with the Islamic separatists.14 In an effort to rectify the situation, Malaysia, with the 
support of the International Contact Group, started to mediate peace talks between the 
GRP and MILF in 1997.15 In 2014, the GRP and MILF signed the Comprehensive 
Agreement of the Bangsamoro, which allowed the “creation of the new Muslim 
autonomous entity called Bangsamoro under a law to be approved by the [Philippine] 
Congress, in exchange for a deactivation of rebel forces by MILF.”16 
                                                 
9 “Mindanao Conflict: In Search of Peace and Human Rights,” Asia-Pacific Human Rights 
Information Center, December 2008, http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2008/12/mindanao-
conflict-in-search-of-peace-and-human-rights.html. 
10 “1987 Constitution,” Supreme Court of the Philippines, E-Library, accessed May 5, 2017, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121028105057/http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/ 
index7.php?doctype=Constitutions&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd64558f82c40d9d. 
11 “ARMM History,” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, accessed May 5, 2017, 
https://armm.gov.ph/discover-armm/history/. 
12 “Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),” Federation of American Scientists (FAS), November 
27, 2001, https://fas.org/irp/world/para/mnlf.htm. 
13 “Moro National Liberation Front,” FAS. 
14 “Philippines Reach Landmark Peace Deal with MILF,” Conciliation Resources, March 26, 2014, 
http://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/news/philippines-reach-landmark-peace-deal-milf. 
15 Kristian Herbolzheimer and Emma Leslie, “Innovation in Mediation Support: The International 
Contact Group in Mindanao,” Conciliation Resources, July 2013, http://www.c-r.org/resources/innovation-
mediation-support-international-contact-group-mindanao. 
16 Kristine Angeli Sabillo, “500 MILF Members to Attend Bangsamoro Accord Signing at Palace,” 
Philippines Daily Inquirer, last modified March 25, 2014, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/588852/500-milf-
members-to-attend-bangsamoro-accord-signing-at-palace. 
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The Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB) has the potential to 
end the Moro conflict although in similar cases, governments or rebels have not honored 
signed peace agreements. For example, the government of Rwanda did not honor a peace 
agreement―the Arusha Accord. The president of Rwanda and Hutu extremists refused to 
accept the terms of the agreement, and the death of the president of Rwanda subsequently 
halted the progress of the Arusha Accord.17 In Sierra Leone, rebels from the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) violated the Abidjan Peace Accord and the Lomé 
Peace Agreement by refusing to disarm.18 Therefore, the GRP or MILF may not honor 
the terms in the CAB despite signing it. If either party violates the terms of the CAB, the 
Philippines may plummet back into armed conflict. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
Given past cases of peace agreements signed between governments and rebels in 
search of prolonged peace, what key variables are possibly required to ensure that the 
rebel integration under the CAB contributes to prolonged peace in the southern 
Philippines? The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program of 
major peace agreements between the GRP and the Moro rebels need to be thoroughly 
examined against these cases.  
This thesis, therefore, conducts an in-depth analysis of DDR programs from 
previous conflict settlements, particularly the peace accord between Philippine 
government and the Moro National Liberation Front. Additionally, case studies of past 
success and failures of similar peace agreements are also examined. These analyses are 
used as a guide in assessing the policy direction of the current rebel integration program, 
which addresses the largest and the last remaining secessionist group in the Philippines, 
MILF. The study also develops a prognosis about future problems and opportunities in 
the implementation of the DDR program specified in the 2014 CAB entered into by the 
GRP and MILF. Though the CAB presents an all-inclusive peace agreement that suggests 
                                                 
17 “Hutus ‘Killed Rwanda President Juvenal Habyarimana,’” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 
January 12, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8453832.stm. 
18 “Sierra Leone,” Global Security, accessed August 8, 2017, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sierra_leone.htm. 
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a likelihood of sustainable peace, its DDR program follows a totally different path of 
reintegrating the rebels from previous agreements, making the rebel integration program 
the determining factor in the outcome of the peace deal. This thesis suggests policy 
interventions in the DDR programs of the GRP–MILF peace agreement to increase the 
prospect of success. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Moro Struggle in Relation to Literature on Conflict Theories   
The Moros’ struggle in the Philippines has continuously challenged the state’s 
authority to rule among the Muslim ethnic minorities in the southern part of the nation’s 
archipelago. A bloody conflict has persisted since the start of this ethno-nationalist 
revolution in 1970s. Although ongoing peace talks between the GRP and MILF have 
ceased violence and armed skirmishes so far, except violence incited by Abu Sayaf and 
other ISIS-Affiliated terrorist group, the final resolution of the Moro problem remains to 
be seen. Considering the general citizenry is still divided on the substantive components 
of the peace agreement, the potential for relapsing into another major armed clash 
becomes imminent.     
There are several useful and applicable theories on ethnic conflicts and civil war 
settlement. Renowned social scientist Louis Kriesberg asserts that a conflict is cyclic and 
follows a sequence of stages moving from emergence, escalation, and de-escalation to 
termination, and culminates with an outcome that normally results in another conflict.19 
He has, however, stated that the conflict can be influenced by internal and external forces 
at different stages with varying results, depending on the nature of the issues of 
disagreement, the characteristics and relations of adversaries, and the manner in by which 
the parties are fighting.20 It is also not surprising that scholars have different views of 
dispute resolution: some perceive the use of military force as an indispensable element in 
resolving conflicts while others think using force hinders a genuine and lasting 
                                                 
19 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 25. 
20 Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 342. 
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settlement. Among the social conflicts, research tends to agree that ethnic insurgency or 
ethno-secession similar to the case of MILF remains the most complex and challenging 
problem to resolve. As Rajat Ganguly has said, once an ethnic political movement 
emerges, it becomes more intractable and engages the state in attrition warfare.21 The 
Moro problem exemplifies the characteristics of an enduring ethno-secessionist 
movement, challenging conflict management experts.       
2. Differing Views on Using Autonomy as a Means of Ethnic Conflict 
Resolution   
Recent studies on dispute resolution, both in academic and policy circles, claim 
that autonomy is becoming a key component of the solution in addressing ethno-
secessionist movements.22 Ted Robert Gurr, a prominent scholar on ethnic struggles, 
emphasizes that the primary principle in resolving insurgent groups wanting to establish 
their own separate country is through decentralization of state power, whereby 
“communal fighting are restrained through recognition of group rights and the sharing 
power.”23 The wide acceptance of this method in resolving ethnic conflict is “evidenced 
by the international community’s preference for autonomy, power sharing, or some 
combination of the two in countries where it has intervened or mediated, such as Angola, 
Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Macedonia, and most recently Afghanistan and Iraq.”24 
Therefore, the ongoing peace settlement between the GRP and MILF, which will allow 
MILF to gain autonomy, may be the key to success in the comprehensive agreement.  
Another school of thought, however, disagrees with the method of using 
autonomy as the primary tool of resolving ethnic secession. Alexander Downes explains 
that, in a federal or autonomous arrangement, the state always suspects the other group of 
                                                 
21 Raymond Taras and Rajat Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 2nd ed. (London: Pearson, 
2001). 
22 Alexander B. Downes, “The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars,” Security 
Studies 13, no. 4 (July 1, 2004). 
23 Ted Robert Gurr, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May/June 2000): 52. 
24 Downes, “The Problem with Negotiated Settlements.” 
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exploiting autonomy as a means for building more muscle in the fight for secession.25 On 
the other side of the coin, this rebellious group remains skeptical of the government’s 
sincerity in its concessions and future intentions. As autonomy is implemented, each side 
distrusts how the political institutions work and whether each side will strictly abide by 
the rules of the game.26 Downes supports this argument and his doubts about the 
effectiveness of autonomy by examining previous agreements that provided self-rule to 
ethnic insurgencies. His research observes that a large percentage of rebellious ethnic 
groups have failed to resolve conflict through autonomy: “Ethiopia’s Afars, Somalis and 
Oromo, Sri Lankan Tamils, India’s Assamese and Bodos, and Pakistan’s Baluchis . . . 
saw serious conflict resume sometime after the agreement was implemented.”27 Despite 
the flaws in autonomy as a method in settling ethno-nationalist conflicts, another author, 
Svante Cornell, argues that this scheme remains the preferred option, being “one of the 
few conceivable compromise solutions in conflicts over the administrative control of a 
specific territory.”28  
Even if the CAB had already been signed between the GRP and MILF in 2014, 
the prospect of ending the armed secession through autonomy would remain a question. 
A number of political analysts in the Philippines argue that autonomy alone cannot 
address the complexity of the Mindanao problem. A leading professor of the University of 
the Philippines laments the CAB by describing it as a repetition of the failed congressional 
act that created the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.29 He further argues 
that the “inevitable failure of such a law would only recruit more people into the 
secessionist rebellion.”30 In the pursuit of autonomy as the centerpiece in the peace 
                                                 
25 Downes. 
26 Downes. 
27 Downes, 4. 
28 Svante E. Cornell, “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical 
Perspective,” World Politics 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 247. 
29 Randy David, “History Repeating Itself,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 4, 2015, 
http://opinion.inquirer.net/85484/history-repeating-itself. 
30 David, “History Repeating Itself.” 
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agreement between the state and its ethnic insurgent group, it is therefore important to 
plan an innovative supporting strategy that comes with autonomy to increase its 
likelihood of success. 
3. Reasons Rebel Integration in the Military Strengthens Conflict 
Settlement  
Integration of rebels into the national military is a supporting strategy that can 
further strengthen peace agreements. Rosalie A. Hall defines integration as the 
“amalgamation of previously opposed military forces into a new state security force or 
the absorption of ex-rebels into an existing armed force.”31 She further stresses that the 
merger of former rebels into the military can address identity-based conflicts because the 
“military is widely seen as an institution where men and women, by their collective 
experience of combat, regimented-living and patriotic values, learn a national identity.”32 
Therefore, the military institution provides a unique environment for eradicating 
differences in ethnicity, religion, or language among a nation’s citizens.33 A series of 
investigations on case studies conducted by Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell also 
conclude that rebel integration in the military decreases the danger of deterioration into 
conflict, especially when combined with other components in conflict settlement such as 
political, economic, and territorial power-sharing.34 The importance of military 
integration in peace agreements is also espoused by contemporary conflict management 
experts, who find “provisions for military integration will reduce the likelihood of peace 
failure in a meaningful and statistically significant way.35 
                                                 
31 Rosalie A. Hall, “From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine Policy of Integrating 
Former Moro National Liberation Front Combatants into the Armed Forces,” in New Armies from Old: 
Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, ed. Roy Licklider (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2014). 
32 Hall. 
33 Hall. 
34 Mathew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military 
Power-Sharing Arrangements,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (May 2003): 303–320. 
35 Karl DeRouen Jr., Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen, “The Duration of Civil War Peace 
Agreements,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 4 (2009): 367–387. 
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The concept of rebel integration in ethno-conflict settlements is a relevant field of 
study in light of the Philippines’ ongoing peace agreement with MILF. Recent efforts to 
demobilize MILF’s ranks produced negative results, as the rebels refused to surrender their 
firearms. It is also known locally that Muslim residents in the conflict-affected areas in 
Mindanao consider owning firearms a way of life because of their culture of blood feuding, 
or rido.36 With the complex dynamics surrounding the Moro problem, an integration 
program may be the most valuable ingredient in the CAB for resolving the Mindanao 
conflict.  
4. The Role of the International Community in Peace Agreements and 
Rebel Integration 
Beside the importance of autonomy and rebel integration in conflict settlement, a 
number of studies also emphasize the critical role of the international community in the 
entire peace process. A study conducted by Barbara Walter on civil war peace 
agreements stresses the crucial role of “third-party guarantors,” which diffuse the level of 
tension and insecurity during peace treaty implementation.37 She adds that these third 
parties, which are normally international actors, ensure contending parties adhere to 
promises and agreements.38 Walter further warns that if outside actors are not involved, 
the peace process will fail.39 In the same manner, Roy Licklider, who conducted a 
comprehensive study of rebel integration, emphasizes the critical role of the international 
community. He claims these outside actors are crucial in military integration because 
they can provide “side payments, offer reassurance, or knock heads together as 
necessary.”40 He also notes that international involvement, though not a requisite for 
                                                 
36 Simone Orendain, “The Persistence of Blood Feuds in the Philippines,” Public Radio International, 
July 25, 2011, https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-25/persistence-blood-feuds-philippines. 
37 Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, 
no. 3 (Summer 1997): 340. 
38 Walter, 340. 
39 Walter, 336. 
40 Roy Licklider, ed., New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Militaries after Civil Wars 
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successful peace accords, has been prominent in almost all civil war settlement cases.41 
Similarly, authors Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis stress  that rebel 
integration can be better implemented when outside assistance provides the needed 
financing and monitoring during peace treaty implementation.42  
Conversely, some instances of international community involvement in rebel 
integration have failed. The international community worked with the new Zimbabwe 
government to implement rebel integration even though it was not part of any peace 
agreement.43 However, the new government eventually undermined rebel integration by 
favoring its own armed wing over the rebels and subsequently forcing the rebels out of 
the military.44 The Democratic Republic of the Congo is another example of international 
community involvement―the UN and southern African leaders―that failed to integrate 
the rebels into the military.45 The Tutsi rebels were supposed to join the Congo military 
but backed out due to delays and lack of confidence in ironing out long-term issues.46  
The role of the international community is a relevant theme in examining the 
GRP–MILF peace agreement, particularly in its rebel integration provisions. Notably, the 
international community was more involved in the peace process with this last remaining 
Muslim insurgent group in the Philippines. Malaysia, together with other international 
partners, is at the forefront of the peace negotiations that led to the signing of the CAB. 
Various monitoring and implementing committees of the peace agreement comprise local 
                                                 
41 Licklider, 250. 
42 Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis, “Rebel—Military Integration and Civil War 
Termination,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 (May 2008). 
43 Anja Melin, Anders Themnér, and Kristine Eck, “Military Integration of Former Enemies: Do 
Previous Identities Matter for the Creation of a New ‘We’?” (master’s thesis, Uppsala University, 2016), 
http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:930454/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
44 Paul Jackson, “The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe: The Integration Process 
following the Rhodesian War and the Road to ZANLA Dominance,” Civil Wars 13, no. 4 (December 
2011): 371–395. 
45 Mark Caldwell, “‘Need for Another Round of Negotiations’ in DRC,” Deutsche Welle, December 
13, 2013, http://www.dw.com/en/need-for-another-round-of-negotiations-in-drc/a-17296194. 
46 Joe Bavier, “Congo Rebel Integration Plan Fails to Begin,” Relief Web, January 28, 2009, 
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/congo-rebel-integration-plan-fails-begin. 
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and foreign counterparts. Specifically, an independent decommissioning body headed by 
a foreign expert supervises the rebel integration program under the CAB.     
D. THESIS METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The main purpose of this study is to conduct an analysis of rebel integration 
programs to forecast prospects and issues in the implementation of the reintegration 
program under the CAB. A comparative study of rebel reintegration programs in previous 
peace agreements, particularly those related to ethno-nationalist movements, was 
conducted to establish patterns or commonalities to assess the viability of the 
reintegration program of the ongoing GRP–MILF peace agreement. The analyses include 
the historical background of related conflicts, the details of the corresponding 
reintegration programs, and the result of the entire process. Literature from think tanks 
and researchers, including comparative analyses, on rebel reintegration from previous 
peace agreements was consulted. The selected case studies center on the peace 
agreements in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the Philippines; these cases were 
chosen especially because they are among the few models with many similarities to the 
ongoing GRP–MILF peace agreement. Notably, these cases are all ethno-nationalist 
movements wherein parties agreed on the path toward autonomy and rebel-reintegration 
played an important part in peace implementation. Most of the sources that inform this 
thesis come from the academic literature on conflict theories, civil war settlements, and 
reintegration processes. Other sources include quantitative and qualitative comparative 
analyses of DDR programs of ethno-national conflicts. Studies conducted by scholars 
from Philippine universities regarding the Moro problem, including recent official 
documents related to peace processes between the GRP and the Moros, are also included 
as major references. 
This thesis is presented in six parts. Chapter II examines lessons learned from past 
rebel integration programs around the world. It discusses the increasing trend of rebel 
integration in civil war settlement. The chapter also provides a wide-ranging method for 
implementing rebel integration programs and determines important variables that 
mattered in most cases of DDR processes. Chapter III discusses three specific examples 
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of rebel integration programs, namely Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. It 
scrutinizes the integration process and the role of the international community in each 
case and analyzes why each agreement failed or succeeded. Chapter IV discusses the 
1996 GRP–MNLF peace agreement and its corresponding rebel integration program. It 
conducts a historical review of the Moro insurgency in the Philippines and the signing of 
the peace accord as well as discusses the integration of former MNLF rebels into the 
national military and police force. Chapter V examines the dynamics in the GRP–MILF 
peace accord leading to the signing of the CAB and ongoing efforts to implement this 
agreement fully. This chapter specifically reviews the rebel integration program under the 
CAB to determine its prospects in of successfully implementing the peace agreement.   
This study concludes with a comparative analysis of the broad examples of rebel 
integration programs outlined in Chapter II; the specific cases in Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and 
Sierra Leone; the MNLF; and the MILF case. Chapter VI focuses primarily on the key 
variables identified in the previous rebel integration cases that mattered most in their 
success or failure. Using the important variables affecting the implementation of past 
rebel integration programs, the final chapter analyzes the prospects of the MILF 
reintegration plan as outlined in the CAB.  
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II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST REBEL INTEGRATION 
PROGRAMS 
Before the end of the Cold War, civil wars used to end with military victories.47 
Since then, however, peace agreements have come into play in a bid to end civil 
conflicts.48 Rebel integration programs are one common component used as part of peace 
agreements to promote peace and possibly prevent civil war from recurring.49 Forty 
percent of peace settlements following the 128 civil wars between 1945 and 2006 
engaged in some form of rebel integration.50 Rebel integration was one component in the 
Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed by the GRP and MILF. 
Would the agreement prolong peace? How would the rebel integration program promote 
or strengthen peace? This chapter highlights factors that contribute to civil war; reasons 
to include a rebel integration program in an agreement; ways to implement the integration 
program; and the results of past conflict settlements that involved a rebel integration 
program. 
A. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO CIVIL WAR 
Civil wars often push a state into domestic chaos, undermining and delegitimizing 
the government and legal institutions.51 Hartzell identifies the struggle for power over a 
state as the fundamental reason why states enter civil war.52 When a group of actors has 
sufficient resources and capabilities, it may challenge the government with the aim of 
                                                 
47 Roy Licklider, “Merging Competing Militaries after Civil Wars,” Prism: A Journal of the Center 
for Complex Operations 5, no. 1 (2014), 53. 
48 Licklider, “Merging Competing Militaries after Civil Wars,” 53. 
49 Ronald Krebs and Roy Licklider, “Misplaced Faith in Military Integration after Civil War,” Policy 
brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 2016, 
http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/misplaced-faith-military-integration-after-civil-war. 
50 Caroline Hartzell, “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s 
End,” in New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, ed. Roy Licklider 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 13. 
51 DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen, “The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements,” 368. 
52 Hartzell, “Mixed Motives?,” 14. 
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claiming power over its state.53 Other possible contributing factors in starting a civil war 
may include the fight for justice for the people, ethnicity issues of a state, money and 
grievances, and ideology over how a country should run.  
In the Colombian civil war, which involved the Colombian government, 
paramilitary groups, and guerrilla groups, rebels claimed to be fighting for justice for the 
people. In particular, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a communist 
guerrilla group, asserted it was fighting for the rights of the poor against the violence of 
the Colombia government.54 This violence was used to enforce social inequality and an 
unfair arrangement of land ownership, which started during the colonial regime. 
Moreover, rural poor workers were not allowed to participate in any forms of politics.55 
Ethnicity was also a common issue in causing a series of civil wars during the 
post–Cold War period. Fearon and Laitin assert that the fundamental concern in these 
civil wars was either the rebellion of ethnic minorities who felt discrimination from 
ethnic majorities or ethnicity forming a wedge between different cultures and nationalist 
aspirations.56 
Other contributing factors to civil war include money and grievances. The Libyan 
civil war is a good example. While the arrest of Fathi Terbil may have been the catalyst, 
it was likely the combined greed of the rebels motivated by possible oil income, 
economical grievances, the lack of political rights, the lifestyle of Gaddafi’s children, as 
well as regional and tribal differences that instigated the civil war.57 
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Ideology is another factor in starting a civil war. The American civil war 
originated in two differing views of civilization.58 As the people in the South earned their 
living through farming, they used slaves to work the land. Therefore, when the people 
from the North attempted to end the practice of slavery, they faced strong opposition 
from the South.59 The ideology of using slave labor was the main cause of the American 
civil war.60 
To find peace amidst such chaos is not simple. DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 
offer many possible methods and circumstances for ending a civil war: military victories, 
stalemates, ceasefires, bilaterally arranged agreements, or third-party mediated 
agreements.61 Werner and Yuen highlight that recent efforts to use agreements in 
whatever form to end a war is important for prolonging peace.62 Fortna shares the same 
sentiment that agreements are important, as they present an opportunity to highlight the 
pros and cons of returning to war.63 However, peace agreements are not fool proof. 
Werner and Yuen note that the inability of the parties involved in the civil war to provide 
credible promises to keep their commitments may cause the breakdown of a peace 
agreement.64 The need for rebels to disarm and disband in a peace agreement equates 
with relinquishing their ability to hold the government accountable for fulfilling the terms 
of an agreement. In addition to such insecurity, rebels are expected to trust in an 
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Textbooks” (Book review, Kent State University Press, September 2005), 
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2 (Spring 2005): 263–265. 
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inexperienced government to make decisions for the state and to consider the interests of 
both parties.65 
It is therefore important to specify terms carefully in the agreement. If the 
agreement includes terms that go against the military’s expectations of the consequences 
of fighting, there will be at a high risk of failure.66 An agreement should determine how 
the civil war will end, and it should address the aforementioned issues that caused the 
civil war. Fortna also recommends that an agreement include components such as 
removing the military presence from the war zone and making credible promises to build 
confidence between parties.67 
B. REBEL INTEGRATION PROGRAMS  
For an agreement to provide assurance to the rebels for them to disarm as well as 
credibility in the commitment of fulfilling the agreement between parties, it must 
enumerate components of power sharing. Many authors indicate that when there are more 
components of power-sharing variables in an agreement, the chances of peace are 
greater.68 Power sharing is meant to address discrimination, to grant the rebels’ desire for 
recognition, and to give the rebels some form of authority in parts of the government, 
territory, or military.69 Therefore, power-sharing variables should include, but are not 
limited to, shared government, autonomy, and sharing of military power. 
Nevertheless, power-sharing variables that are more expensive and difficult to 
implement may hamper the chances of prolonged peace, as the government may 
renegotiate the terms stipulated in the agreements, and rebels may choose to take action 
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against the government for delaying the implementation of the agreement.70 Therefore, it 
is important to simplify the implementation of the power-sharing variables at a low cost 
to facilitate the chances of prolonged peace.  
As the GRP and MILF recently signed the CAB, which includes sharing of 
military power, this section focuses on one form of military power sharing, rebel 
integration. The simplest way to share military power is to integrate rebels or non-state 
actors into the military to form one military force.71 DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen also 
highlight that it costs less for the government to undertake such a risk by allowing ex-
rebels into the military, and the government will eventually gain full control of the 
integrated military.72 Rebel integration is thus defined as the absorption of ex-rebels into 
an existing armed force.73 Table 1, provided by Hartzell, indicates a rising trend of rebel 
integration with the military in peace agreements since 1960.74 For example, the first 
civil war in Laos did not include a form of power sharing in a peace agreement and only a 
second civil war included the agreement of rebel integration with the military.75 The 
Republic of Congo, too, made a similar arrangement for rebel integration with the 
military as part of the peace agreement.76 
Rebel integration reduces the rebels’ insecurity, so such programs have become 
increasingly popular.77 Rebel integration also allows the rebels to maintain some level of 
self-enforcement as well as to reap benefits of employment.78 Therefore, rebel integration 
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would in a way provide credible security assurance to MILF that the government would 
not renege on the signed CAB.  
Table 1.   Trend of Rebel Integration in Peace Agreements79 
 
 
C. WAYS TO IMPLEMENT REBEL INTEGRATION PROGRAMS 
In order for the rebels to agree to the peace agreement, the government needs to 
provide credible security guarantees.80 Such guarantees may be provided by integrating 
the rebels into a new army.81 Hartzell offers three means of integrating rebels with the 
military: using a formula for the division of troops among the active military, integrating 
the leaders of the rebel group into key leadership positions of the military hierarchy, and 
maintaining a balance of rebels retaining their arms or their own security forces.82 
Hartzell’s recommendations seem intuitive, but this thesis offers the following deviation 
for rebel integration. The first method for integrating rebels into the military is to 
integrate the rebels as troopers in the military. Another method is to integrate the 
                                                 
79 Source: Hartzell, “Mixed Motives?,” 16. 
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81 Glassmyer and Sambanis, 365. 
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 19 
leadership of a rebel group instead of integrating the rebel troopers. Lastly, the rebel 
group may be allowed to form a unit using its own people and leaders as part of the 
government’s military structure. 
There are a few formulas that may be used to decide on the proportion of rebels 
and active military troops. If the government is concerned with integrated rebels taking 
up arms against the government again, the government should consider the proportion of 
active military forces to the number of the integrated rebels. This consideration ensures 
the government has sufficient military muscle to overcome the integrated rebels in the 
event they decide to rebel against the government. If the government is confident that the 
rebels will not take up arms, the proportion of active military troops and integrated rebels 
may be equal. Integrating the rebels at the troop level not only provides assurance to the 
rebel leaders that the government genuinely wants to fulfill the peace agreement; it also 
provides assurance to the government that the rebels also genuinely want to end the civil 
war and cooperate to stabilize the state of affairs. 
At the strategic level, integrating the leaders of the rebel group into military 
leadership positions sends a strong message to the rebel group that the government is 
sincere about ending the civil war and provides a strong sense of security that the 
government will fulfill the terms of the peace agreement. This option allows rebel leaders 
to have a sense of authority as part of power sharing. However, this may not go down 
well with active military troopers who had to climb the ladder to reach a leadership 
position. The rebel leaders may be seen as “parachuting” into the leadership role and 
military troopers may not fully submit to them, which may lead to morale problems 
among the active military troops.  
Another viable option is for the military to allow the rebels to form a unit under 
its command using their own people and leaders. It is important for their own leaders to 
be placed on the leadership position, leading their troops in training and operations. It 
will ease the tension of rebel troops having to submit to new authorities and will work 
well under the familiar leadership style of their leaders. This option eliminates the 
aforementioned submission and morale issues and sends a strong message to the rebel 
group that the government is sincere about ending the civil war. It also provides a strong 
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sense of security that the government will fulfill the terms of the peace agreement at the 
strategic level. 
D. ANALYSIS OF PAST CONFLICTS  
It is important to examine past civil wars that ended with a peace agreement and 
had rebel integration as a component to offer insight into what variables are required to 
successfully end a civil war. Licklider cites the following as civil settlements in which 
rebel integration was instrumental in ending civil war: Lebanon (1989), Rwanda (1993), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Philippines (1996), Sierra Leone (1996), South Africa 
(1997), and Burundi (2004).  
The Bosnian civil war was the most detrimental conflict in Europe since 1945 
with more than 100,000 people killed and two million displaced.83 The Dayton Accords 
signed by Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in 1995 eventually ended the civil war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina with the aid of the NATO and the United States.84 The Dayton Accords 
stipulated the integration of the militaries, which resulted in one strong and unified 
force.85 
Rwanda ended its three-year civil war when the government of Rwanda and the 
rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front signed the Arusha Accords in 1993.86 The peace 
agreement was mediated by the Tanzanian, French, Belgian, and U.S. governments as 
well as the Organization of African Unity.87 This agreement also successfully integrated 
50,000 rebels to form one powerful military force.88 
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Similarly, Sierra Leone had a series of signed peace agreements before effectively 
ending its civil war in 2002.89 Under the aid of the UN, the Organisation of African 
Unity, and the Commonwealth, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) signed the first Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996.90 However, the RUF 
did not honor the terms of the agreement, and the president of Sierra Leone was forced 
into exile by a military coup, resulting in the failure of the peace agreement.91 After 
many years of conflict, the Sierra Leone government decided to negotiate with the RUF 
and signed the Lomé Peace Agreement with the help of the international community in 
1999.92 However, the RUF reneged on the terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement and 
refused to disarm, leading to the breakdown of the peace agreement.93 The Sierra Leone 
government finally signed the Abija Ceasefire Agreement with the RUF, with a UN 
mission in Sierra Leone enforcing the RUF’s cease-fire.94 All three peace agreements had 
the component of rebel integration.95 Unfortunately, the RUF did not honor the terms in 
the first two agreements and needed the UN mission to enforce the cease-fire after the 
last peace agreement.96 
With the previous three examples, it is clear the international community needs to 
intervene to enforce the peace agreement for rebel integration to happen. The 
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international community can pressure both parties to negotiate a peace agreement, 
provide resources such as money and training to ensure the success of the peace 
agreement as well as assurance and enforcement of the peace agreement. However, it is 
naive to think that the intervention of the international community alone is sufficient to 
bring about peace and to end a civil war. As the saying goes, it takes two hands to clap. 
Thus, both the government and the rebel group must be able to see that a military victory 
in the civil war is no longer possible, and only a compromise can end the conflict. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Wars are expensive, yet wars recur. Fearon gives three reasons why wars persist. 
First, people are generally irrational and carry biased perspectives that lead to war 
without considering its cost. Second, leaders who agree to go to war are unlikely to feel 
its cost and may actually benefit from it. Third, rational leaders may still end up at war as 
long as the cause is justifiable.97 No existing studies prove peace agreement is the key to 
ending civil wars. However, it is clear that rebel groups have clear goals for what they 
want from the start of the civil war. As long as the expectations and goals of the 
government and the rebel group have something in common, an agreement may be put in 
place in search of peace.  
While statistics indicate that the success of prolonging peace using rebel 
integration is low, this component assists the government in gaining trust from the rebels 
and convincing the rebels to disarm. It is already a step toward prolonging peace away 
from violence. Putting violence aside makes negotiations on the peace agreement slightly 
easier, so both parties can work out their differences amicably. Rebel integration as part 
of a peace agreement provides assurance to the rebels that, despite disarming, they are 
neither vulnerable nor devoid of bargaining power. The benefits of employment by the 
military allow the rebels to bring food to the table for their families. On this note, the 
government should not take too long to implement the rebel integration as it may lose 
their confidence, causing them to take up arms against the government again. The 
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government, therefore, should not bite more than it can chew by not to overpromising on 
the terms of the peace but should keep the terms of the peace agreement simple and easy 
to implement. 
The international community’s involvement to help piece the peace agreement 
together provides greater assurance that either party will be under certain pressure to 
honor the terms of the peace agreement. The international community may also assist in 
the enforcement of the agreement’s terms. In the case of the Bosnian war, when the 
Serbians failed to comply with the cease-fire and fired around Sarajevo, NATO fighters 
performed enforcement by shooting down the Serbian aircraft.98 
Whichever form of rebel integration is adopted by the GRP and MILF, the rebel 
integration should be able to provide credible security to rebels when they disarm, offer 
the rebels some form of economic benefits through employment, as well as help both the 
GRP and MILF form one identity as a state. The involvement of Malaysia with the 
support of the International Contact Group will also apply pressure and assurance for 
both the GRP and MILF to honor the terms of the CAB. 
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III. CASES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
The pursuit of peaceful resolution by many countries in civil wars reveals that 
political integration efforts are often futile when there is a lack of deep understanding of 
the particular context and origins of the rebels.99 Thus, studying the failed and successful 
cases of Zimbabwe’s, Rwanda’s, and Sierra Leone’s integration of rebels helps to sieve 
out variables for sustainable peace is important. This chapter considers these three cases 
by examining the backgrounds and political agendas of the rebels, the implementation of 
the rebel integration between parties involved, and key variables that led to either the 
failure or success of the integration. 
A. ZIMBABWE 
Following the independence of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from the 
British in 1964, the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia organized themselves and 
unilaterally declared independence with the aim of maintaining white rule.100 The 
declaration was in response to the foreign policy of British decolonization, which 
supported black African rule.101 The self-declared independence molded the white 
minority Rhodesians into a state capable of fighting against African liberation 
movements, which were pursuing black rule and total independence from Britain, with 
the help of Portuguese East Africa and the apartheid regime of South Africa.102 As such, 
the highly capable Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) was formed to conduct 
counterinsurgency operations.103 Against this backdrop, three liberation movements were 
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formed against the white minority government.104 The Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) as well as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) chose to go 
into armed conflict with the RSF using their armed wings, the Zimbabwe African 
National Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 
respectively.105 A third movement, the African National Council (ANC) chose to engage 
politically with the white minority government and believed in progressive change over 
violence.106 
In an agreement in 1979, Rhodesia was renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and after a 
general election, Muzorewa from the ANC became Rhodesia’s first black prime 
minister.107 However, neither ZANU nor ZAPU recognized the new government, and 
they increased their presence within Rhodesia.108 Four separate attempts by different 
organizations and countries were made to mediate a settlement to the civil war.109 Only 
the fourth, the Lancaster House Conference, succeeded in producing an agreement among 
all parties to end hostilities, form a new majority rule constitution, and hold elections.110 
All parties were willing to accept the terms of the agreement because they were confident 
they would win sufficient seats in the 1980 election to assert influence over the political 
direction of the new state.111 Eventually, ZANU won the election, and the Republic of 
Zimbabwe was declared independent.112 
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1. Background of the Rebels 
Melin, Themnér, and Eck explain that ZANLA, which formed in 1965, consisted 
of forced recruitment of peasants from Zambia.113 ZANLA’s ultimate aim, they continue, 
was to reinstate black rule. With the collapse of the Portuguese regime in Mozambique, 
ZANLA began a campaign against the Rwandan government in the early 1970s.114 
Thereafter, the authors affirm that many students and refugees joined ZANLA due to 
their awareness of the growing politics. Members of ZANLA were mostly Shona-
speaking and came from the eastern parts of the country; they were indoctrinated in 
Maoist teachings as ZANLA followed the lead of its sponsor, China.115 Melin, Themnér, 
and Eck go on to explain that members of ZANLA were also educated on the national 
grievances such as inequalities, discrimination, and oppression. ZANLA also penetrated 
deep within communities, forming networks between political cells and fighters.116 The 
Shona ethnicity played a big part in creating a strong identity for ZANLA.117   
Melin, Themnér, and Eck also highlight that ZIPRA was formed about the same 
time as ZANLA and had a similar aim of black rule.118 Most ZIPRA members were of 
Ndebele ethnicity and, hence, were recruited primarily from the western part of the 
country.119 The authors also share that many members joined ZIPRA due to their 
background in political activism, anger toward the current system, discrimination, and a 
lack of economic opportunities. The authors go on to explain that, similar to ZANLA, 
members of ZIPRA were educated with political training and principles of socialism.120 
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As ZIPRA preferred to use military force, the authors indicate identity as soldiers as well 
as a Ndebele ethnic background created a common identity for the group’s members.121 
While ZANLA and ZIPRA had a common goal of black rule, the desire for power 
within each party may have led them to hate each other. The ethnicity of both parties may 
have also played a part in their mutual animosity. However, the key difference that led to 
this hatred was their differing methods: ZANLA preferred political activities and to 
unsettle military training while ZIPRA preferred to use military force.122 
When Muzorewa from the ANC became the first black Rhodesian prime 
minister,123 ZANLA and ZIPRA increased their violent guerilla activities against the new 
government.124 Consequently, the international community had all leaders involved in 
the civil war come to an agreement during the Lancaster House Constitutional 
Conference in search of peace.125 
2. The Integration Process 
The United Kingdom, the United States, and the UN played a big role in the 
negotiation process for peace. Meetings among ZAPU, ZANU, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the UN began in 1978 in search of peace.126 The UN Security Council 
eventually adopted Resolution 445 to condemn the Rhodesian elections in 1979.127 
Subsequently, the British were given the mandate to mediate, which led to the Lancaster 
House Constitutional Conference held in London between September and December 
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1979.128 All leaders involved in the civil war were invited to the conference, and the 
discussion at the conference eventually led to a comprehensive set of agreements:  
The summary of the independence Constitution, arrangements for the pre-
independence period and a cease-fire agreement signed by the parties. The 
signatories would agree to accept the authority of the Governor, to abide 
by the independence Constitution, to comply with the pre-independence 
arrangements, to abide by the cease-fire agreement, to campaign 
peacefully and without intimidation, to renounce the use of force for 
political ends and to accept the outcome of the elections and instruct any 
force under their authority to do the same.129 
Upon the start of the cease-fire in 1979, the British sent a governor with the 
Commonwealth Observer Group to assist the governor in ensuring the security that would 
allow free and fair campaigning and elections.130 A Commonwealth Monitoring Force of 
1,300 troops, mostly from the British Army, was also deployed to seal the border upon 
the implementation of the cease-fire, to prevent any operations by the RSF from across 
the border, as well as to manage any breach of the cease-fire.131 The British also 
established a process for demobilizing the rebels, which included designating rendezvous 
points around the country for any guerillas willing to demobilize.132 
Although integrating rebels into the military was never part of any agreement, the 
agreement provided a platform to develop cooperation between parties.133 A stronger 
involvement of UK Ministry of Defense officials in the Lancaster House Conference 
became necessary when it was decided the United Kingdom would assist in military 
development.134 The first step of the integration process was to assist in the integration of 
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all demobilized guerrillas into the old structures of the Rhodesian Army.135 The ex-
guerrillas were given the same salaries as the Rhodesian African soldiers.136 Prior to the 
elections, all parties agreed to undergo combined training, with ZANLA and ZIPRA to 
go under the authority of Commonwealth and Rhodesian forces.137  
However, the integration was chaotic, as clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA 
combatants were common in the integrated military.138 White soldiers also resigned from 
the military en masse, which resulted in a weakened Zimbabwe National Army following 
the successful election of ZANU.139 Nevertheless, the new government continued to 
integrate ZIPRA, ZAPU, and select elements of the RSF into the military as the new 
government saw rebel integration as a platform for providing internal security as well as 
employment prospects for former combatants.140 Mugabe also removed the South 
African ANC units and returned them to Zambia in a bid to avert attacks from South 
Africa.141 Unfortunately, Mugabe of ZANU undermined the integration by favoring 
ZANLA over ZIPRA.142 Such favoritism led to a series of violent acts by ZIPRA, 
causing the disintegration of three battalions and fighting between parties.143 Mugabe 
eventually arrested all ZIPRA senior leadership in the military and sacked all senior 
leadership of ZAPU from his cabinet.144 Even though the Unity Accord, signed in 1987, 
had reintegrated ZAPU back into ZANU, Mugabe managed to gain complete control of 
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the security forces, and ZANLA was the only remaining party from the initial tripartite 
power-sharing structure.145 
3. Analysis 
It is interesting to note that rebel integration into the military was never part of 
any agreement, yet it was implemented by the international community and the new 
government. Both parties believed in the importance of the rebel integration, as it would 
provide cooperation between parties and provide jobs for ex-guerillas. All demobilized 
guerrillas were simply integrated into the old structures of the Rhodesian Army and were 
paid the same amount as the Rhodesian African soldiers. The international community 
effectively developed the demobilizing process for guerillas and provided training to 
ZANLA and ZIPRA prior to the elections.  
Unfortunately, the rebel integration in Zimbabwe was ultimately a failure, as 
more violence occurred after the integration. The new government also undermined the 
integration by favoring ZANLA, which led to violence by ZIPRA. Mugabe schemed to 
purge ZIPRA and ZAPU out of the system and took total control of the military and 
government. Despite its involvement, the international community was ineffective after 
the election as the new government took charge of the integration. The key point of 
failure was that the rebel integration into the military was never part of the agreement, 
despite support from the international community and the new government. Hence, the 
international community was unable to oversee the integration and follow through 
effectively. Moreover, the new government also did not follow through with the 
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B. RWANDA 
Rwanda has been plagued with violent conflicts since its pre-colonial period due 
to inequality and social tensions.146 In the pre-colonial period, Rwanda was occupied by 
a range of ethnic groups including the Twa, Tutsi, and Hutu.147 The Tutsi were generally 
in positions of power during the pre-colonial and colonial periods.148 In transition toward 
independence, the Hutu took over control and pushed the Tutsi officials out of power.149 
The Tutsi had no choice but to leave Rwanda and become refugees in Uganda.150 
Massacres of Tutsi continued and became common under the dictatorial rule of the 
Hutu.151 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed primarily by Tutsi who were in 
exile.152 The Rwandan civil war began in 1990 when the RPF launched an attack against 
Rwanda from Uganda that lasted for three years.153 Consequently, the Rwandan 
government and the RPF signed the 1993 Arusha Accords, which included rebel 
integration into the military as well as the transfer of powers from the president to the 
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incoming government.154 Progress in implementing the Arusha Accords was halted as the 
president of Rwanda and Hutu extremists disagreed and refused to accept the terms of the 
agreement, which had been settled by a delegation from the Rwandan government at the 
Arusha negotiations.155 The president of Rwanda was subsequently killed when his plane 
was shot down when making an approach to Kigali airport.156 The assassination of the 
president led to the Rwandan genocide wherein many Tutsi and Hutu opposition 
members were killed.157 Eventually, the RPF successfully took control and forced the 
Hutu government out in 1994, which led many Hutu to seek refuge in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, then Zaire.158 The RPF subsequently used military integration to 
form a security force that assisted in stabilizing and legitimizing the country.159 
1. The Rwandan Patriotic Front 
The Tutsi were in the minority of the total population, comprising 17 percent prior 
to independence in Rwanda.160 Despite their small numbers, the Tutsi were the upper 
class and in power during the pre-colonial and colonial periods.161 The status and power 
of the Tutsi were the result of a long-standing contract that made Hutu serve the Tutsi in 
exchange for the loan of cattle and land.162 The Tutsi reaped the benefits of the 
hierarchical system, which gave them power over the Hutu.163 The exile of the Tutsi 
                                                 
154 Stephen F. Burgess, “From Failed Power Sharing in Rwanda to Successful Top-Down Military 
Integration,” in New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, ed. Roy 
Licklider (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 90–91. 
155 Burgess, “Successful Top-Down Military Integration,” 90–91. 
156 “Hutus ‘Killed Rwanda President,’” BBC. 
157 Dagne, “Rwanda: Background and Current Developments,” 1. 
158 Dagne, 1. 
159 Burgess, “Successful Top-Down Military Integration,” 91. 
160 Kuperman, “Provoking Genocide,” 63. 
161 Erin Galloway, “The Tutsi,” Mount Holyoke College, accessed August 23, 2017, 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~gallo22e/classweb/website-World%20Politics/The%20Tutsi.html. 




followed shortly after the independence, when the nationwide ethnic massacres against 
them began. The exiled Tutsi eventually formed the RPF with its armed wing, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), and leveled several attacks against Rwanda.164 The RPF 
eventually managed to force out the Hutu and used military integration to form a security 
force that assisted in stabilizing and legitimizing the country.165 
2. The Integration Process 
The United States, France, Belgium, Zaire, Burundi, and the Organization of 
African Unity started formal negotiations for the Arusha peace process in June 1992, 
when the Hutu and Tutsi could not come to a compromise and had to gather in France to 
discuss the terms of the peace agreement that was to take place in Arusha.166 The Arusha 
Accords were eventually signed in August 1993; part of the agreement stipulated rebel 
integration as well as the transfer of power from the president of Rwanda to the incoming 
government. Unfortunately, the assassination of the president led to the Rwandan 
genocide, which led to approximately 800,000 death.167 The international community 
was unable to assist when the genocide happened, as the major powers were hesitant to 
bolster the overwhelmed UN peacekeeping force.168 
The RPF continued to fight against the genocidal forces on its own. The RPF 
eventually overcame opposition forces and effectively ended the genocide in 1994.169 
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Subsequently, the RPF formed the Government of National Unity170 and focused on 
forming a security force used in stabilizing and legitimizing the country.171 
As the RPF faced the possibility of attacks by the exiled Hutu forces residing in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, a national army was created.172 The national defense of 
the country was the national army’s only objective.173 The RPF started to transform its 
RPA guerrilla force into a conventional military.174 It was no easy task, as the guerillas 
refused to be reeducated and retrained to form a national army.175 As Rwanda required a 
large force to defend the country, the RPF also had to take the risk of integrating former 
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) soldiers into the national army176 in multiple absorption 
programs between 1995 and 1997.177 Fortunately, the leaders of the RPF/RPA insisted 
that integration was the right choice for stability and sustainable peace, so they bit the 
bullet to pull through the integration.178 A total of 10,500 former FAR soldiers were 
integrated into the RPA.179 The foundation of the integration process was based on 
Protocol III of the Arusha Accords.180 The integration included an indoctrination process 
as well as comprehensive military training before deployment of forces.181  
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3. Analysis 
Military integration seemed to have failed after the Arusha Accords were signed. 
The failure was due to the refusal of the president of Rwanda and Hutu extremists to 
accept the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, the death of the president of Rwanda, for 
which the Tutsi were blamed, also caused a halt to the progress of the Arusha Accord. 
The subsequent genocide in 1994 and the invasion of the Tutsi-led armed group182 also 
caused delays in the progress of the Arusha Accord. Against this backdrop, the 
international community could do little to oversee the military integration or the transfer 
of power to an incoming government. 
Subsequently, the successful integration of the RPA and former FAR soldiers was 
due to a top-down process driven by the newly formed government. Notably, the RPF’s 
desire to integrate the military force was strong, as doing so would provide stability and 
legitimacy to the country and government. The RPF wasted no time in integrating the 
former FAR into the national army. The integration was also made simple for the former 
FAR soldiers by indoctrinating them and having them join the ranks of the established 
RPA. Furthermore, the aid of the international community that led to the signing of the 
Arusha Accords paved the way for the integration process.  
Despite multiple attacks by the exiled Hutu, the RPA was able to defend against 
them. The RPA was also able to turn from a defensive mode to an offensive mode when 
it attacked the Hutu residing in the Democratic Republic of Congo and destroyed their 
refugee camps. This victory caused many Hutu refugees and former FAR to return to 
Rwanda and had them integrated into the military. 
C. SIERRA LEONE 
Sierra Leone had a series of signed peace agreements before effectively ending its 
civil war in 2002.183 Under the aid of the UN, the Organization of African Unity, and the 
Commonwealth, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front 
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(RUF) signed the first Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996.184 However, the RUF did not 
honor the terms of the agreement, and the president of Sierra Leone was forced into exile 
by a military coup, causing the failure of the peace agreement.185 After subsequent years 
of armed conflict, the Sierra Leone government was pressured domestically and 
internationally to negotiate with the RUF and signed the Lomé Peace Agreement with the 
help of the international community in 1999.186 However, the Lomé Peace Agreement 
was disrupted, as the RUF again reneged on the terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement and 
refused to disarm.187 The Sierra Leone government finally signed the Abija Ceasefire 
Agreement with the RUF, with an UN mission in Sierra Leone enforcing the ceasefire 
before the resumption of the Lomé Peace Agreement.188 
1. The Revolutionary United Front 
The RUF was a guerrilla unit in Sierra Leone that aimed to destabilize and depose 
Sierra Leone’s government.189 The formation of the RUF went back to the beginning of 
1990s; it was started by Foday Saybana Sankoh and Charles Taylor, leader of National 
Patriotic Front for Liberia and eventual president of Liberia.190 The RUF was greatly 
unpopular as it derived its funding from attacks on the population.191 The RUF also 
recruited children into its ranks by force through these attacks.192 As such, the RUF 
comprised many uneducated youths with no political awareness. Another target for 
recruitment was the large population of youths who were outcasts from society, unable to 
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enjoy the benefits of citizenship in Sierra Leone.193 These youths had to survive by 
working in diamond mines and illicit trades.194 Despite having to engage in violence 
against the people, these youths were willing to join the RUF in exchange for physical 
security and social empowerment.195 
The domestic and international community exerted immense pressure on the 
president of Sierra Leone due to the constant violent attacks of the RUF against the 
capital. Consequently, the Sierra Leone government negotiated the 1996 Abidjan Peace 
Accord and the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement with the RUF to end the civil war.196 
2. The Integration Process 
The UN, foreign diplomats, and some Sierra Leone civil society representatives 
assisted in the negotiations, which led to the signing of the Lomé agreement.197 The 
British, together with the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), 
initiated and supervised the security sector reform with plans that included reorganizing 
the Ministry of Defence and establishing the Military Reintegration Programme.198 A UN 
peacekeeping force was also deployed to oversee the disarmament and demobilization 
process of the RUF.199  
The Lomé agreement targeted power sharing between the government and the 
RUF.200 Four cabinet posts and four deputy ministerial positions were provided by the 
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government for the RUF.201 The Lomé agreement included the appointment of Sankoh as 
the chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic, Resources, National 
Reconstruction, and Development.202 All RUF rebels were acquitted of crimes 
committed during the armed conflict.203 The Lomé agreement also provided for a 
military integration, which allowed willing rebels and soldiers from the RUF, Civil 
Defence Forces (CDF), and Sierra Leone Army to join if they met the “established 
criteria.”204 The Ministry of Defence was reorganized according to the British model of 
joint civil and military management, and the Sierra Leone Armed Forces were also 
restructured to accommodate the integration.205 
Unfortunately, the integration did not gain traction, as the RUF turned against the 
Lomé agreement and refused to disarm.206 The UN peacekeeping force came under 
attack in the RUF-controlled areas while assisting with disarmament and 
demobilization.207 The president of Sierra Leone decided to integrate a significant 
number of former junta soldiers from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council with the 
CDF and existing SLA forces to fight against the RUF.208  
The RUF was eventually subdued by the ad hoc integrated force with the aid of 
the UN and British forces.209 The United Kingdom, IMATT, and the UN peacekeeping 
force continued to see to security sector reform.210 The new Ministry of Defence was 
eventually established and integrated about 2,500 former rebels and soldiers from the 
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RUF and CDF who accepted the invitation to join the new armed forces.211 The 
integration amounted to 14,500 soldiers in the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces.212  
3. Analysis 
The refusal of the RUF to disarm and demobilize delayed the reform. The delay 
was of no fault of the government or the international community, however, as it already 
planned to implement the reform. The Military Reintegration Programme was also 
relatively simple, as anyone who joined the armed forces would go through a nine-week 
basic infantry training program.213 Former rebels or soldiers involved in the arm conflict 
were also deliberately separated into different units.214 
The involvement of the international community was critical in the entire reform 
process. Unlike the cases of Zimbabwe and Rwanda, in Sierra Leone, the international 
community was able to be involved in the negotiation of the Lomé agreement and 
provided guidance to the government in planning the reform. The international 
community also closely monitored the progress of reform and, most importantly, saw 
through the entire reform right to the end.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Zimbabwe’s military integration failed because the component was never part of 
any peace agreement, and it was eventually undermined by the new government. Even 
with the aid of the international community, and even though the process of integrating 
the rebels into the military was made simple, the integration could not be successful.  
Rwanda had a taste of both failure and success with military integration. The 
refusal of the president of Rwanda and Hutu extremists to accept the terms of the Arusha 
Accords, coupled with the death of the president of Rwanda, halted the progress of the 
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Arusha Accord. The chaos that followed prevented the international community from 
overseeing the military integration and the transfer of power to an incoming government. 
Fortunately, the new government insisted on forming an integrated military, which led to 
the successful integration of the RPA and ex-FAR soldiers. The new government wasted 
no time in integrating the ex-FAR soldiers and made it simple for them to join the ranks 
of the established RPA. Remarkably, the aid of the international community, which led to 
the signing of the Arusha Accords, paved the way for the integration process. 
Sierra Leone is an example of a successful military integration. This is not to say 
that Sierra Leone had an easy time integrating formal rebels and soldiers involved in the 
armed conflict into the military. The Sierra Leone government did not delay in the 
planning and implementation of the integration and made it relatively easy for former 
rebels and soldiers to join in the military. The key to its successful military integration 
was the deep involvement of the international community, which monitored the reform 
until the end. 
The aforementioned failures and successes highlight the importance of genuine 
commitment by both the government and the rebels to end the civil war. Similarly, the 
GRP and MILF must genuinely commit to end the civil war in the Philippines. 
Furthermore, there are three more key variables to ensure that the integration would be 
successful. First, the GRP should not take too long to integrate rebels into the military, as 
this would cause insecurity among the rebels during the disarmament and demobilization 
process. Second, the GRP should also make it easy for the rebels to join the ranks of the 
military so as not to cause any delays in the integration. Third, as Malaysia and the 
International Contact Group start to mediate peace talks between the GRP and MILF, it is 
important that they should see the integration through to the end. The GRP and MILF 
should also involve Malaysia and the International Contact Group fully in the planning 
and implementation of the integration to increase the likelihood of success. 
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IV. MUSLIM INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES 
AND THE REBEL INTEGRATION UNDER THE 
1996 GRP–MNLF PEACE AGREEMENT 
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has been confronted 
continually with domestic insurgencies since the country’s independence from the United 
States in 1946.215 The GRP has frequently carried out military operations to crush the 
insurgents, but the government ultimately resorted to peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
In most cases, conflict settlements introduced by the GRP offered the rebels amnesty, 
resettlement, and reintegration programs.216 This approach of integrating former rebels 
into Philippine society or into the government’s security forces became a norm in almost 
all peace accords entered by the state and the different rebel groups in the country. In 
particular, the program of integrating former insurgents into the national military or 
police was seen as an important component of the GRP’s peace agreement because it was 
widely accepted among the rebels. This type of program was therefore considered as an 
important element of an effective long-term formula in resolving the conflict. Among the 
notable cases of rebel integration initiated by the GRP are the Economic Development 
Corps program for the resettlement and reintegration of Hukbalahap rebels in 1951; the 
GRP–MNLF Peace Accord in 1996, whereby Muslim rebels were integrated into the 
Philippine military; and the peace agreement between the GRP and the Cordillera 
People’s Liberation Army in 2011, which resulted in the integration and conversion of a 
communist rebel group into a socio-economic organization. 
Of these initiatives, the Philippines’ most significant and comprehensive rebel 
integration program was the 1996 peace agreement between the state and the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF). As part of the peace package agreed to by the GRP 
and the MNLF, more than 5,000 Muslim insurgents were integrated into the country’s 
national army and police units. More than 10 years since the peace agreement was signed, 
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most of these rebels remain in the military service. Nowadays, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) consider these rebel-integrees as regular soldiers because they have 
been fully integrated into the state’s security forces. Despite this seemingly remarkable 
achievement of the rebel integration program, some question the outcome of this effort. 
In his study of rebel integration cases, based on success variables for reducing the 
probability of civil wars, renowned author Roy Licklider classifies the MNLF integration 
program as a relatively successful endeavor.217 Licklider admits, however, that success in 
military integration, as in the MNLF case, does not guarantee an end to the resurgence of 
civil war. It only reduces the chances of renewed hostilities.218 On the other hand, 
Rosalie Alcala-Hall argues that the MNLF integration program contributed very little to 
lasting peace in the southern Philippines.219 She adds that the Muslim rebel integration in 
the 1996 GRP–MNLF peace accord was mainly a “window dressing” for the 
government’s failed efforts to implement the needed structural reforms on the issue of 
poverty and Muslim marginalization.220 
Nonetheless, many aspects in the MNLF rebel integration case provide valuable 
lessons in the planning and implementation of similar programs to support long-term 
conflict settlement. This chapter examines the 1996 GRP–MNLF Peace Agreement, 
particularly its rebel integration program, discussing the history of conflict involving 
Muslim rebels in Mindanao, the negotiation process that led to the GRP–MNLF peace 
deal, the MNLF integration program, and its implications in the current security situation 
in the southern Philippines.   
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A. BANGSAMORO PROBLEM AND THE GRP–MNLF PEACE 
AGREEMENT 
To better grasp the conflict in Mindanao where the MNLF rebellion surfaced, it is 
important to look back to the introduction of Islam in the Philippines, the Spanish and 
American colonization, and the struggle of a young independent Philippines to 
consolidate its porous and ethnically divided archipelago of more than 7,000 islands. 
According to various studies of the conflict involving the Muslim people in the southern 
Philippines, the Mindanao problem resulted from the history of politicization of the Moro 
identity, the underdevelopment and unequal wealth distribution of the region, and the 
shortcomings of the Manila central government in consolidating the Moros into the 
political institution of the nation.221 The abundance of natural resources in Mindanao also 
provided the impetus for the government and Moros to engage in an armed struggle 
starting in the late 1960s.222 It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an 
exhaustive historical background of the conflict. Nevertheless, significant events and 
their implications in the conflict are presented as a brief background to the centuries of 
armed struggle involving the Muslim people in the Philippines’ southernmost islands.   
1. The Birth of the Moros and Their Struggle  
The MNLF rebels were fighting for ethnic minority Muslim communities, 
representing less than 10 percent of the country’s populace and residing mainly in the 
southern region of Mindanao.223 Their history as a community is tainted with antagonism 
against the colonial powers and the central government in Manila.224 The Muslim people, 
or Moros, were dragged into a conflict with the central government on the arrival of 
Western colonizers three centuries ago.225 
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Prior to the arrival of colonizers in the 15th century, the Philippine islands were 
not yet united as a nation. Mindanao, which is one of country’s three largest islands, was 
virtually a separate region from the rest of the Philippines. Historical records show that 
independent Islamic sultanates already existed in Mindanao, with their own socio-
political-economic systems and even trade relations with neighboring nations like 
Borneo, China, and Malaysia.226 Islam was introduced to Mindanao and other parts of the 
Philippines by traders from Central Asia, India, China, and Southeast Asia.227 Arab 
merchants and scholars brought Islam using these trade routes, which gave rise to Islamic 
settlements in Mindanao.228 The settlements later became sultanate systems with well-
organized administrative and governing structures. The Sultanate of Sulu was in fact once 
considered a military authority in the Sulu Sea, as demonstrated in its assistance to the 
Sultan of Brunei in 1658 to quell a rebellion.229 As a show of goodwill for military 
support, the Sultanate of Brunei gave the Sabah region of Borneo to the sultan of Sulu 
(see Figure 1).230 As a result of the strong Islamic political system endured in Mindanao, 
the Moro people resisted the military campaigns of Western colonial powers for 
centuries, effectively preserving their political and social identity as a Bangsamoro, or 
Moro nation.231 
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Figure 1.  Map of the Sultanates in Mindanao (Early 15th Century)232 
2. Moro Subjugation during the Colonization Period  
The continuing conflict involving the Muslim people in Mindanao can be traced 
back to the Spanish and American colonial periods.233 Unlike the early settlements in 
other parts of the Philippines, which submitted easily to the colonizers, the Moros 
fiercely resisted conquests for centuries. Spain attempted but failed to incorporate 
Mindanao and convert the people to Christianity as it had on the islands of Luzon and the 
Visayas.234 Resistance from the Sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu successfully 
frustrated attempts by Spain to conquer them, so the colonizers managed to raise heavily 
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defended forts only on some coastlines of northern Mindanao.235 The Muslim sultanates 
retained varying degrees of independence from Spanish rule for more than three 
centuries. The Moro struggle even today claims to continue this legacy of defending the 
ancestral dominions of the Muslim sultanates.236 
Western historians, however, attribute the confrontational approach of Spanish 
colonizers to the Muslim pirates who continually seized Spanish trading ships passing the 
Sulu and Celebes Seas in the southern Philippines. As commerce prospered, so did 
piracy; Sulu bandits increasingly struck ships and looted, murdered, and enslaved 
captured civilians.237 Filipino Christians were kept as slaves in the sultanates or sold in 
the Dutch East Indies.238 Regardless of the real story behind these conflicts, the most 
persistent effect of Spanish colonization in Mindanao was the geographical divide 
between the Christian north and Muslim south, an alienation that unintentionally led to a 
non-Christian Moro identity.239 
The United States inherited the Moro problem when it bought the entire Spanish 
colony in the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris in the wake of U.S. victory in the 
Spanish-American War in 1898.240 The United States continued its predecessor’s 
strategy of establishing absolute control over all regions of the country, including the 
sultanates in Mindanao.241 The Americans, however, were more effective than the 
Spanish had been in gaining a foothold in Mindanao.242 The Americans had initially 
made treaties with the sultans by promising not to interfere with the Muslim culture or 
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religious matters. Then, U.S. corporations started taking control of large tracts of land 
and forest.243 This prompted the migration of people from the Christian-dominated 
islands of Luzon and Visayas to work on large plantations as well as for mining and 
logging corporations.244 Eventually, migrant workers from outside Mindanao dominated 
in number and social status.245 
Later on, corporations in Mindanao further polarized the Muslim people and 
ignited conflict.246 Moros started organizing an armed resistance against the American 
colonizers in 1902; bloodshed began with an attack on a U.S. cavalry regiment.247 The 
conflict escalated when the Americans responded with bloody military offensives, such 
as the infamous 1906 Bud Dajo massacre in Jolo, Sulu, where a thousand Muslims were 
slaughtered by U.S. troops.248 Nonetheless, the American colonizers were able to take 
control of Mindanao for two decades, and Muslim leaders agreed to assimilate into the 
U.S.-run government in the Philippines. However, when the United States promised 
independence to the Filipino people as early as 1921, Moro leaders vehemently opposed 
the annexation of Mindanao to an independent Philippine nation.249 Moro leaders 
demanded they be granted a separate independence, particularly for the islands of 
Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan.250 
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3. The Moros under the Philippine Republic 
When the United States finally passed the reigns of governance to the Filipino 
elites in 1935, the Moro situation remained the same.251 Despite the objection of Muslim 
rulers, the sultanates in Mindanao were assimilated into the independent Philippine 
republic.252 The new Filipino administration under President Quezon dubbed Mindanao a 
“land of promise” that had to be used to generate revenue for the national government.253 
The government encouraged Christian settlers to migrate to the resource-rich region as a 
solution to peasant discontent, the result of rising population and low production in 
Visayas and Luzon.254 Consequently, a law was eventually passed and approved by the 
Philippine congress declaring all Moro ancestral domains as public lands.255 In 
Mindanao, the Moro people became a minority, second-class residents as more and more 
Christians settled.256 
Moro leaders continued to assert their right to independence from the Philippine 
Republic.257 In 1968, the Muslim provincial governor of Cotabato, Mindanao, issued a 
manifesto, known as the Mindanao Independence Movement, calling for independence of 
the Moro land.258 The seemingly passive Moro independence movement quickly spread 
into an armed rebellion after being triggered by local and international events. One such 
incident was the infamous 1968 Jabidah massacre on Corregidor Island, where 28 young 
Muslim recruits, trained by the Philippine military for a secretive operation in Sabah, 
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Borneo, were allegedly killed by their trainers. Reports claimed that the Muslim trainees 
mutinied because of maltreatment and refused to obey orders to infiltrate Sabah.259 
This bloodbath affected Muslim Filipinos, especially Moro students in secular 
colleges in Manila and in Islamic universities in the Middle East. Many of these young 
Muslim students became radicalized during the worldwide trend of Arab nationalism and 
the revitalization of Islamic awareness in the 1960s.260 These incidents further solidified 
the Mindanao Independence Movement and prompted the subsequent confluence of all 
Muslim tribes in the sultanates of Mindanao for the creation of the Moro National 
Liberation Front in 1969.  
4. The MNLF and the 1996 Peace Agreement 
The Moro National Liberation Front was formed as a politico-military 
revolutionary movement of the Muslim people in Mindanao, advocating the right to self-
determination and secession from the Republic of the Philippines, with the aim of 
establishing an independent Bangsamoro (translated as “land of the Moros” in the local 
dialect). Among the major causes of the movement’s creation, as identified by key 
MNLF leaders, were the rise of Islamic nationalism, land-grabbing in Mindanao by new 
settlers, the Jabidah massacre, and discontent in the government’s failure to solve social, 
political, and economic problems.261 
It was the massacre in Corregidor that most galvanized the Moros because it 
emboldened them to fight back after gaining a potent international ally, a Muslim brother 
and neighbor―Sabah, Malaysia. When the Jabidah incident happened, Malaysia 
suspended bilateral relations with the Philippines.262 There were reports that the 
Malaysian government conducted training for Moro rebels in Sabah and provided 
weapons, transportation, and ammunition to the movement as early as 1969.263 
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Accordingly, the MNLF was formally created in western Malaysia, where one of its first 
batches of trainees was named for the front’s chairman, Nur Misuari.264 Armed 
confrontation became violent in Mindanao, especially after President Marcos declared 
martial law in 1972. Casualties quickly rose―thousands were killed by government 
forces and MNLF rebels while hundreds of civilians were displaced from intense 
fighting. Christian settlers in Mindanao also formed vigilante groups called Ilaga due to 
growing hatred from Muslims, further exacerbating the volatile situation.  
As the skirmishes dragged on, both the MNLF and the Marcos administration 
eventually bore the brunt of the war. MNLF chairman Misuari requested firearms and 
funding from rich Islamic states, with Libya becoming one of the principal sponsors.265 
The rising number of Muslim civilians affected by the conflict caught the attention of the 
influential Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which eventually recognized the 
MNLF with “observer status” in the organization by 1975. Meanwhile, the conflict 
drained the Marcos government of financial resources. From 1973 to 1975, the 
administration had already deployed 80 percent of its armed forces in Mindanao.266 
With the increasing international support for the MNLF, rising expenditures for 
the rebellion, and the risk of sanctions from oil suppliers in the Middle East, Marcos 
pushed for negotiations with the MNLF.267 In 1976, representatives from the Marcos 
government and the MNLF finally met in Libya in the presence of the OIC, which 
brokered a peace settlement known as the Tripoli Agreement.268 The agreement generally 
adopted the principle of autonomy, instead of secession, as the solution to the Moro 
problem. As stipulated in the agreement, 13 provinces and nine cities of Mindanao would 
be granted autonomy. The central government, however, remained the authority in 
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matters related to international relations, military affairs, mines, and mineral resources.269 
Similarly, the autonomous Muslim areas were also given the freedom to establish Sharia 
courts and educational institutions, administer their own financial and economic systems, 
and organize a regional security force.270 These broad principles outlined in the 
agreement have become the basic framework for resolving issues with the Moros.271 
The Tripoli Agreement did not materialize as intended, however. The supposed 
granting of autonomy for 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindanao was met with 
opposition from non-Muslim political groups. They claimed that Christians were the 
majority in many areas mentioned in the agreement, but they had not been consulted on 
the matter. Christian-dominated communities also expressed their concern once they 
were forced to be incorporated into MNLF-ruled provinces, as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Location of 13 Provinces for Autonomy under the Tripoli Agreement 
vis-à-vis Muslim-Christian Settlements in Mindanao272 
Marcos insisted that a plebiscite should be held in the 13 provinces; the MNLF 
denounced these deviations from the provisions of the agreement. In 1977, the peace 
settlement collapsed, with Misuari claiming that the Marcos administration did not abide 
by the terms of the Tripoli Agreement. 
The peace agreement started working again when Marcos was succeeded in a 
“people power” revolution in 1985, by President Corazon Aquino, who opened the line 
for a peace negotiation. The MNLF leadership and the Aquino administration ultimately 
pursued the terms of the Tripoli Agreement; the government, however, insisted that, as 
part of the democratic process, a plebiscite be held in the 13 provinces and nine cities 
before autonomy was granted. The plebiscite took place, with the people voting either 
“yes” or “no” for autonomy. As expected, only the four Muslim-majority provinces voted 
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for autonomy.273 The result led to the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM), a self-governing political entity bestowed with executive and 
legislative powers over the four provinces and cities that voted for autonomy.274 
However, the MNLF initially rejected the conduct of the plebiscite, claiming it did not 
adhere to the Tripoli Agreement. The implementation of ARMM was stalled, and fighting 
resumed.275 Aquino’s presidency ended without achieving a mutually accepted and 
workable approach to end the conflict.  
5. The 1996 Final Peace Agreement 
In 1996, the administration of President Ramos, with the help of Indonesia and 
the OIC, made a breakthrough in the government’s peace efforts with the signing of the 
GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA).276 This historic event received worldwide 
accolades, earning both MNLF leader Nur Misuari and then Philippine President Fidel 
Ramos the Felix Houphouet-Boigny Peace Prize from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization. The agreement was considered groundbreaking 
because it fully implemented the Tripoli Agreement.  
The FPA was to be implemented in two phases. The first phase was a three-year 
transition period for confidence building and public awareness in the 14 provinces and 
ten cities under the management of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD), headed by Nur Misuari and a consultative assembly.277 During 
this phase, major projects in infrastructure, water supply, energy, agriculture, and health, 
among others, were implemented with financial support from local and international 
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sources.278 This phase also provided for the planning and integration of 7,500 MNLF 
rebels into the national army and police.279 The second phase created a new autonomous 
political entity, an expanded ARMM, with provinces and cities determined through a 
plebiscite. Other important aspects of the agreement comprise the autonomous region’s 
representation in all departments of the national government, inclusion of Islamic 
curriculum in the education system, the establishment of Sharia courts, and the creation 
of a special regional security force.280 Both the SPCPD and ARMM were to be headed 
by Nur Misuari. With Misuari’s leadership in both institutions, it was obvious early on 
that this peace settlement would gain the confidence of Muslim residents in the region 
and assure non-Muslims that autonomy would be beneficial to all.281 
While the GRP–MNLF Peace Agreement was considered a breakthrough in 
Mindanao’s decades-long conflict, based on the events that followed during its 
implementation, observers were divided on whether the agreement was successful.282 
The peaceful relationship between the GRP troops and the MNLF rebels during the 
implementation period was viewed by some as a sign of success for the FPA. Reports 
indicated that there were no more major armed skirmishes between the mainstream 
MNLF and the AFP. These reports are attributed to the more than 5,000 MNLF rebels 
successfully integrated in the Philippine military and police units within the first three 
years of FPA implementation. The GRP, however, was still conducting combat 
operations in Mindanao while the FPA was being implemented. But these actions were 
directed against other armed groups in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and 
the Abu Sayyaf Group. Meanwhile, many observers were dissatisfied with how the 
autonomous Muslim political entity, or ARMM, governed. Though the FPA provided 
autonomy in Muslim-majority areas in Mindanao, it failed to satisfy the expectations of 
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the public and international community.283 In the first three years of its implementation, 
ARMM under Nur Misuari was frequently blamed for mismanagement and corruption.284 
For example, nepotism was rampant in many offices of the region. One respected figure 
in the peace movement even accused Misuari of making ARMM positions an “exclusive 
club of the MNLF.”285 Other Muslim tribes, such as the Maranao and Maguindanao in 
the provinces of Cotabato and Lanao districts, accused Misuari of supporting only his 
Tausug constituents.286 Consequently, reports of corruption were high as there were 
instances when ARMM employees did not receive their pay or benefits287 Moreover, a 
large portion of the funding was routed to projects that benefited people close to Misuari, 
instead of allocated for needed programs in Muslim villages.288 Misuari, however, 
claimed that his administration’s shortcomings were by and large a result of the failure of 
the national government to supply ARMM’s needed resources. Some observers 
contended that ARMM was exclusively dependent on foreign aid, which gave the 
impression that the GRP lacked commitment.289 Philippine leadership responded that 
support given to ARMM was based on the financial capacity of the state with 
consideration for reasonable and proportionate allocation of resources to all other regions 
of the country.   
In the implementation of the FPA, Misuari was not successful in resolving 
internal tensions among the different Moro groups inside ARMM, which affected 
security in the region. The most prominent among these groups is the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), which is a breakaway faction of the MNLF. MILF began 
receiving more extensive support from the Maranao and Maguindanao tribes, who felt 
that ARMM was already controlled by their longtime rival—Misuari’s Tausug tribes of 
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Sulu. The rivalry among these three major Moro tribes in Mindanao originated centuries 
ago when Mindanao was ruled by the Sultanates of Maguindanao, Lanao and Sulu. The 
leaders of both rebel groups had been in opposition partly because of their tribal 
disparities but primarily due to their ideological and political differences. MILF 
leadership continued to fight for an independent Islamic state while the MNLF had given 
up independence in exchange for regional autonomy.290 
Misuari’s term as governor failed to fulfill the people’s expectations for a 
peaceful and progressive autonomous region for the Muslim communities in Mindanao. 
Discontent began to rise in the region, and many people started to view the 1996 peace 
agreement as flawed.291 The MNLF leaders splintered into new factions with the 
majority challenging the chairmanship of Misuari with ARMM. Among the most 
prominent factions was the MNLF Executive Council of 15, or EC-15, which represented 
the most respected MNLF commanders in ARMM provinces. Misuari was eventually 
deposed from ARMM and then imprisoned when he led an armed attack in 2001 against 
military units at his hometown in Sulu. The attack was prompted by Misuari’s rejection 
of the ARMM’s elections proposed by the government and EC-15, for which Misuari 
would have had a slim chance of winning. Despite its imperfections and limitations, the 
1996 Final Peace Agreement has endured with ARMM gradually improving its 
governance over time. Former MNLF commanders have also shown great progress in 
leading the autonomous Muslim region, with Mujiv Hataman as the eighth ARMM 
governor, in office since 2011.  
B. THE MNLF REBEL INTEGRATION PROGRAM  
Along with the concept of an autonomous Muslim region, the prime movers of the 
1996 Final Peace Agreement also considered the status of the MNLF combatants as a 
critical component in resolving the armed conflict. As such, the FPA provided for the 
integration of MNLF fighters into mainstream society either by absorbing them into the 
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Philippine military and police units or by returning them to their communities as peaceful 
and productive citizens.  
The provisions pertaining to the MNLF rebel integration program are stipulated in 
Articles 19 and 20 of the agreement. The agreement specifically states that the Philippine 
government, through existing laws and regulation, must provide vacancies for 1,500 
MNLF fighters in the Philippine National Police (PNP) and for 5,750 in the AFP.292 For 
the remaining MNLF members who are not absorbed into the government’s security 
sector, the agreement specifies, “There shall be a special socioeconomic, cultural and 
educational program . . . to prepare them and their families for productive endeavors, 
provide for educational, technical skills and livelihood training and give them priority for 
hiring in development projects.”293 One of the MNLF commanders was also allotted the 
position of deputy commander of the Southern Command, AFP, during the transition 
period. The position is a one-star general equivalent because the Southern Command is 
the AFP’s largest unified command, responsible for providing command and control in 
all military operations in Mindanao. Another section of the agreement requires the 
establishment of the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF). The SRSF shall be 
composed of former MNLF rebels and shall perform police functions within the ARMM. 
Among the projected roles of the SRSF are the following: “the enforcement of all laws 
for the protection of persons and properties; the maintenance of public safety, law, and 
order; the investigation and prevention of crimes, apprehension and or detention of the 
alleged offender for prosecution, among others.”294 The SRSF is under the authority of 
the chairman or governor of the autonomous region.  
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In fulfilling the integration program, President Ramos issued Administrative 
Order 295, directing the defense department as the implementing agency.295 This 
directive outlines the period of implementation, rules and responsibilities, phases of 
integration, disposition of surrendered firearms, and funding support. The MNLF 
integration program was to be carried out in three years to commence within one month 
of the administrative order with the following phases of implementation: processing, 
individual training, c (OJT) with deployment as separate units, and integration into AFP 
units.296 In the processing phase, the MNLF was given the leeway of selecting from 
among its ranks 5,500 primary candidates and 2,500 alternate candidates to be processed 
for integration into the AFP.297 Selected rebel candidates were also required to turnover 
their individual weapons upon reporting to training centers; otherwise they would not be 
processed.298 The MNLF was also expected to submit the complete roster of personnel 
by unit and location as reference for the processing teams. The individual training phase 
included a 48-week basic military officer or candidate soldier course similar to military 
entry training for regular soldiers of the Philippine Army. Upon completion of the basic 
military courses, the provisions required candidates to undergo OJT in AFP units within 
ARMM and to organize as separate units during the peace agreement’s transition period. 
After their OJT, candidates would be fully integrated as regular officers and enlisted 
personnel in the AFP.299 
Though there were reported shortcomings in its actual implementation, the rebel 
integration program pushed through as planned. The AFP was able to process 448 officer 
candidates and 8,473 enlisted personnel candidates who were further screened for the 
military training phase. In consideration of the limited capacity of training sites and the 
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staggered submission of the MNLF list of candidates, the training was divided into five 
batches, which began in November 1996 and ended in August 2002.300 Out of these 
groups, 220 officers and 5,530 soldiers completed the training and were organized into 47 
separate rifle companies and ten separate engineer companies.301 After completing their 
OJT, they were eventually absorbed into different Army units deployed in 
Mindanao―completing their full integration as members of the AFP. These former rebels 
turned soldiers continue to serve the Philippine Army today, performing the same tasks, 
subject to similar regulations, and receiving the same privileges as any other soldiers in 
the AFP. Meanwhile, the MNLF applicants for police integration were administered by 
the Philippine National Police. Those who qualified underwent training in courses related 
to the criminal justice system, adherence to human rights, and police operations.302 One 
thousand MNLF fighters completed the police integration process.303 This number was 
within the quota stipulated in the peace agreement. Looking at these data, the total 
number of rebels who were fully integrated into the country’s security forces reached 
more than 6,000 individuals. This significant number of former rebels, now having stable 
jobs and incomes, was expected to wield a substantial impact in the long-term outcome of 
the peace process. It was also anticipated that the success in the program would further 
resonate into the families and communities of the rebels-turned-soldiers.  
MNLF members who were not absorbed into the security sector also benefited 
from various socio-economic and educational programs. Among the notable projects 
implemented in support of these endeavors were the college-level educational training to 
qualify for Army enlistment; project management and construction training, which 
provided skills to build 163 bridges in the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao with 
support from British engineers; the hybrid corn farming and seaweed growing programs 
that benefited more than 5,000 MNLF members; as well as the United States Agency for 
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International Development and United Nations Development Program–sponsored socio-
economic and livelihood projects that benefited more than 14,000 former MNLF fighters 
and their families.304 
Despite the number of implemented programs and projects, rebel integration did 
not transpire seamlessly for both parties and all stakeholders involved. The program came 
with varied stories of problems, shortcomings, misunderstandings, compromises, and 
sacrifices. One of the most significant concerns in the early part of the program was that 
not all rebel-applicants could be integrated.305 Even when some of the requirements were 
waived, a large fraction of the rebels were not accepted because they were illiterate, and 
some were already in their 50s. This created delays in the processing as well as 
frustration among the military and rebels alike. The parties reached a compromise when 
MNLF fighters were given the option of recommending a proxy, such as a younger 
relative, who met the qualifications.306  
Another important issue was the disarmament program that accompanied 
integration. The AFP was able to collect more than 5,000 assorted high-powered firearms 
from the MNLF, who turned over their weapons either as a requirement for the rebel-
military integration or through the government’s cash reward program for every weapon 
surrendered. However, some reported the MNLF as an organization was not actually 
disarmed through this program. The Moro were known to embrace a culture of gun-
ownership due to their history of inter-Muslim tribal conflicts called rido, or blood feuds. 
Because of this culture, a number of MNLF rebels turned over only lesser quality or 
caliber rifles. Some even “sold” their guns through the government’s cash-for-weapons 
program and used the profit to buy higher quality guns from the black market. MNLF 
members who were absorbed in the military also reportedly applied for bank loans to 
purchase personal weapons for protection at home. The consequence was not 
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disarmament but arms proliferation in the Muslim communities and the retention of the 
rebel’s weaponry.307  
The AFP found the task of integrating its former enemies a challenging 
experience. For one, the program was the first time a large number of Muslims were to be 
trained and absorbed into the Army units in Mindanao. This meant an Army battalion that 
may have had few or no Muslim personnel would have to fill 50 percent its ranks with 
former MNLF rebels, about 250 slots for the average battalion. Integrating more than 
5,000 MNLF personnel into the AFP made a significant impact on the Army battalion’s 
culture, traditions, and support facilities. Among the significant transformations or 
adaptations made by the Army were training modules and routine unit activities that 
considered the religious practices of Muslims, such as Friday prayers and fasting; 
mosques in military camps or at least designated Muslim prayer rooms; Muslim food 
menus in mess halls; and special literacy training and educational grants for Muslim 
soldiers to keep them on pace with the standards of the Army.308 Through these efforts 
and despite some reported cases of discrimination, most of the MNLF who were 
integrated felt fully accepted in their military units as their religious practices had been 
respected.309   
There were also instances when both the GRP and the MNLF had differences in 
the interpretation of the rebel integration provisions of the agreement. Nur Misuari raised 
the issue of creating separate MNLF units from the rebels who had been integrated. He 
insisted the MNLF integrees should not have been absorbed into Army battalions, but 
organized and employed as separate units. However, the AFP officer in charge of force 
integration explained the creation of separate units was implemented only during the OJT 
phase.310 The separate units were eventually dissolved when the MNLF integrees were 
finally integrated into Army battalions. The AFP officer further opined that it would be a 
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ridiculous idea for the military to support the organization, equipment, and operation of  
purely MNLF-integree units from a national security perspective.311 Doing so might have 
resulted in these separate units being used by unscrupulous MNLF leaders against the 
state.312 Even with all the challenges faced in implementing the integration program, 
many observers described it as generally successful, and one that provides prime 
examples for how two warring groups “can work on building trust and confidence and 
later on, achieve a common goal.”313 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter essentially presented the complexity of the Moro problem whose 
origin can be traced back centuries ago when colonizers and then the Philippine 
government manipulated, oppressed, and neglected these people until they became 
minorities in their own lands. The conflict further galvanized with President Marcos’s 
repressive policies and was exacerbated by the rise of ethno-religious pride among the 
Moro people. The 1996 GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement was therefore a milestone 
in the decades-long effort to end the conflict because it contained provisions that both the 
leaders of the Philippine government and the Moro people agreed with and believed 
could bring lasting solution to the conflict. Most observers would, however, critique the 
peace agreement as a failure. Instead of peace, fighting continues to exist in Mindanao. 
Nonetheless, many also agree that the FPA provided many lessons learned and somehow 
made considerable progress in the path toward lasting peace in the region.  
One key lessons learned from this experience is the critical role of the 
international community. This study confirms the importance of international 
organizations in all stages of the peace process. The intervention of the OIC that pushed 
both parties to come to the table and start negotiating for peace eventually led to the 
Tripoli Agreement. Similarly, the OIC and Indonesia were also instrumental in 
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facilitating the signing of the final peace agreement. The international community was 
also significantly involved throughout the implementation of the FPA. Nevertheless, most 
of the foreign assistance focused solely on the provisions of socio-economic and 
educational programs. There was less involvement of international organizations in 
matters that had a direct impact on exercising autonomy and in the disarmament and 
reintegration programs. In future peace endeavors, the international community can be 
valuable in these areas because it can hold parties accountable in adhering to the 
agreement’s provisions.  
The forerunners of the FPA have identified autonomy and rebel integration as key 
elements in the peace formula for Mindanao. This thesis tends to conform to the idea that 
the peace agreement was not a hastily made contract but a product of painstaking years of 
negotiations, compromises, and facilitation. Autonomy should therefore be the 
centerpiece in the implementation of an agreement with rebel integration as a key 
component. The establishment of ARMM as an autonomous political entity for the 
Muslim community, and its continued existence today, indicates significant progress in 
this peace endeavor. Though there were shortcomings in how ARMM governed during 
the early years of its creation, the organization continues to evolve and improve over the 
years as well as gain the trust and confidence from its constituents.  
The rebel integration program in the FPA has also played an important role in the 
peace accord. Without it, other programs may not have been implemented or may have 
been limited. Rebel integration somehow reduced the tension among soldiers and MNLF 
rebels as they now work together under one organization. The relative success in the 
rebel integration program has been attributed to the flexibility and adaptability of the 
AFP in absorbing former MNLF members. The Army units had to make abrupt 
organizational changes to accommodate former enemies into their ranks. That these 
rebels-turned-soldiers still serve the AFP after 20 years of military service attests to the 
success of the program. There are, however, many areas in which the rebel integration 
program did not considerably succeed. The disarmament and demobilization of the 
MNLF was not fully attained. Only those who availed themselves of rebel integration and 
the cash-for-guns programs turned over their firearms, which was a small fraction of the 
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reported strength of the MNLF organization. The MNLF did not allow their entire 
organization to demobilize as in other disarmament programs. Possible approaches to 
facilitate complete disarmament and demobilization include the establishment of 
programs that cater to all MNLF members and the adoption of unit integration instead of 
individual application.   
This chapter concludes that the Moro problem is indeed complex and unique in 
itself. The experience in the GRP–MNLF agreement illustrates how difficult it is to 
implement seemingly perfect peace formulas in the real-world setting. Despite its flaws, 
the implementation of the agreement showed chances of realizing the goal of lasting 
peace in the region. Efforts must first be geared toward garnering the support and 
cooperation of the people. This can be achieved by progressively removing the history of 
hatred among Muslims and Christians through various programs that address the matter. 
There are already many areas in Mindanao where Muslims and Christians live peacefully 
together. Attaining this peaceful situation in the entire region may facilitate the 







V. THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT AND THE 
PROSPECTS OF THE INTEGRATION PROGRAM UNDER THE 
GRP–MILF COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE 
BANGSAMORO 
The Moro problem in Mindanao did not end with the implementation of the 1996 
GRP–MNLF peace agreement; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter 
group of the MNLF, continued the armed struggle for Moro independence. The 
Government of the Philippines (GRP) and MILF, however, had explored possibilities of 
peacefully ending the conflict. As early as 1997, President Ramos opened talks with 
MILF. These talks continued with succeeding administrations, though these negotiations 
were oftentimes interrupted by violent skirmishes between the government forces and 
MILF armed groups. The most recent among these peace efforts resulted in the signing of 
the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. Many observers 
believe that the CAB is the answer to the Moro problem because it is a more inclusive 
peace agreement. Moreover, both the government and MILF leadership, having learned 
many lessons from their experiences with the 1996 GRP–MNLF peace agreement, have 
become more adept at providing valuable feedback in the formulation of the CAB. This 
chapter examines the dynamics in the GRP–MILF peace negotiations leading to the 
signing of the CAB and the significant efforts to realize this agreement. In particular, the 
rebel integration program outlined in the CAB is examined to determine its prospects of 
contributing to the outcome of the peace agreement.      
A. MILF AND THE GRP–MILF PEACE AGREEMENT 
1. MILF as a Secessionist Movement 
The MILF insurgency was originally part of the MNLF, which successfully united 
the Moro people in the fight for independence from the Philippine government in 
1971.314 The emergence of MILF in 1977 was a result of splintering in the central 
committee of the MNLF due to ideological and ethno-religious differences―–most 
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notably between Hashim Salamat and Nur Misuari, who had deeply rooted disparities in 
their political and religious views.315 The MNLF leader, Misuari, a Tausug from the 
island of Sulu, espoused a Marxist-inspired movement, having been a professor at the 
University of the Philippines where frontrunners of the country’s communist insurgency 
also originated. Salamat, on the other hand, led a breakaway group and created MILF. In 
contrast to Misuari’s predispositions, Salamat was a Maguindanaoan from mainland 
Mindanao, educated at Egypt’s Al-Azhar University during those times when Arab 
nationalism and Islamic independence movements were on the rise.316 The ideological 
break manifested in the two opposing approaches of the MNLF and MILF, which 
continue to the present day. The MNLF advocated for a more secular orientation for 
Moro self-rule under Philippine sovereignty.317 MILF, however, pursued self-
determination, with the establishment of an independent Islamic state as its ultimate 
goal.318 The split also resulted in polarization among ethnic associations of both groups. 
MILF received the support of majority Maguindanoan, Iranun, and Maranao tribes in 
mainland Mindanao while the MNLF membership was generally confined to the Tausug 
tribes in the island provinces of Sulu and Basilan.     
From a mere splinter group, MILF managed to gradually increase its 
organizational capabilities and influence in the region, becoming even more dominant 
than the MNLF. It was able to build up its war machinery and manpower surreptitiously 
while the GRP and the MNLF were engaging in peace talks―even when it sought 
recognition to participate. Nevertheless, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 
which facilitated the negotiations, excluded MILF from the peace process, as it 
recognized the MNLF as the sole representative of the Moro people.319 Having been 
sidelined in the GRP–MNLF peace process, which dragged on for more than 30 years, 
MILF was able to expand by 1999 from 5,000 ill-equipped members to around 11,000 
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fully armed fighters.320 Aside from its weaponry, MILF also claimed it had established 
13 major camps and 33 auxiliary camps in Muslim-majority provinces in Mindanao.321 
MILF was therefore in a position of strength when it started entertaining the 
government’s offer of a negotiated settlement in 1997―a year after the signing of the 
1996 GRP–MNLF peace agreement.  
2. Negotiating Peace with MILF 
a. Early Efforts to Cease Hostilities and Begin Talks 
Because MILF was outside the GRP–MNLF peace talks, early efforts of the 
government and MILF to negotiate was conducted only through unofficial channels. 
Formal peace talks between the Philippine authorities and MILF began after the signing 
of the GRP–MNLF peace agreement in 1996. When the Ramos administration finally 
concluded the armed conflict with the MNLF through the FPA, it began sending peace 
emissaries to MILF.322 In 1997, MILF eventually agreed to a ceasefire to pave the way 
for peaceful negotiations.323 
During the early part of the negotiations, the Ramos government and MILF 
presented two opposing positions. MILF demanded an independent Islamic state while 
the Philippine government asserted that talks should remain within the bounds of the 
constitution, which would not compromise the country’s territorial integrity.324 MILF 
finally came up with nine key issues that became the agenda for resolution in the 
negotiation process: “ancestral domain, displaced and landless Bangsamoro, destruction 
of properties and war victims, human rights issues, social and cultural discrimination, 
corruption of the mind and the moral fiber, economic inequities and widespread poverty, 
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exploitation of natural resources and agrarian related issues.”325 The talks did little to 
bring concrete settlement on these issues. Instead, observers noted an alarming increase 
in the intensity of armed conflict between the two parties.326 As a result, the peace 
initiatives of the Ramos administration focused only on the cessation of hostilities.    
Under the succeeding Estrada presidency, the negotiations continued sluggishly 
but eventually came to a halt, resulting in a full-scale government offensive. The 
controversial issue that triggered the hostilities was the MILF’s demands for recognition 
and delimitation of their camps. MILF argued that a ceasefire agreement would not hold 
because government forces deployed on the ground were intruding in their communities. 
They claimed that the recognition of their camps for the duration of the peace talks would 
help prevent unintentional confrontations between the military and rebels.327 As a 
“confidence building measure,” the GRP acknowledged seven of MILF’s major 
camps.328 This condition, however, only worsened the situation because the specific 
boundaries of these camps were the most difficult detail to settle. The government 
recognized only “those areas where MILF forces [were] actually situated” while MILF 
insisted that each camp extended more than a thousand square miles.329 To make matters 
worse, MILF began establishing its own military checkpoints along the highways near its 
camps and started collected “taxes” from the commuting public.  
The GRP panel’s decision to recognize these camps was eventually met with 
severe criticism. Many observers viewed it as a blunder330 that facilitated MILF’s goal of 
achieving belligerency status, a step toward gaining international recognition as a state. 
Thus, President Estrada pushed to reverse the decision and demanded MILF arrive at a 
                                                 
325 Dictaan-Bang-oa, “The Question of Peace in Mindanao,” 165. 
326 Dictaan-Bang-oa, 165.  





peace agreement with the government within a year or before the end of 1999.331 MILF 
reacted with a hard stance and initiated large-scale atrocities, such as a passenger ferry 
boat bombing that killed 41 civilians and the MILF armed-takeover of a Christian-
majority municipality of Kauswagan.332 President Estrada eventually declared “all-out 
war” against MILF, which resulted in the government’s seizure of all rebel camps. The 
skirmishes killed and wounded hundreds on both sides and displaced thousands of 
civilians. Though MILF was forced from its camps, or “territories,” it continued the 
struggle in guerilla-type warfare.        
The ouster of President Estrada due to civilian–military protest and his succession 
by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo provided optimism in the peace efforts with 
MILF. The Arroyo administration and MILF immediately resumed dialogues and 
introduced many innovations and improvements to the peace process. The GRP and 
MILF jointly committed to a political approach to solve the Moro problem and attain 
lasting peace and development in Mindanao.333 Both parties agreed to simplify the 
agenda of the peace talks to viable issues related to security, rehabilitation, and ancestral 
domain. Both the GRP and MILF also acknowledged the importance of third-party 
facilitation and monitoring. The Arroyo government invited Malaysia to be the facilitator 
and asked the support of international organs to monitor the cessation of hostilities. The 
government also facilitated the creation of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) 
composed of officials from Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Libya, and Japan among others. 
To coordinate and facilitate law enforcement operations against criminals and terrorists 
operating inside MILF-controlled areas, the negotiating parties agreed to organize the Ad 
Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG).334 The AHJAG comprised representatives from 
MILF and the GRP whose main purpose was to prevent the military and police from 
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unintentionally hitting MILF when pursuing criminals in MILF territories.335 These 
peace mechanisms reinforced the resolve of both parties to end the conflict. Though there 
were some major armed confrontations between government forces and MILF, such as 
the Buliok incident in 2003, the peace settlement made substantial progress.336 The 
negotiating parties were already expecting to sign a peace agreement at the end of 2005, 
with significant steps taken by both parties on the security and rehabilitation agenda. 
What remained a major challenge among the negotiating teams was the issue of ancestral 
domain, which triggered subsequent events affecting the peace process.    
b. The 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
In 2008, the negotiating panels from both the GRP and MILF came close to 
resolving the most contentious issue in the peace negotiation agenda—ancestral domain. 
For MILF, ancestral domain was the answer to the Moro problem because it would define 
the breadth of Moro territories and determine their power over the political entities and 
resources. In the negotiations, MILF accepted that it could no longer take back the 
original domains of the historical Moro sultanates, which comprised almost the entire 
islands of Mindanao and Palawan. However, they had also wanted more than the territory 
granted to the Moros during the 1996 GRP–MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA), which 
included the areas covered by the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM).337 These demands made the ancestral domain issue contentious because MILF 
was essentially asking for the same territories that had already been granted to the MNLF 
through the FPA. Moreover, the additional territories that MILF demanded were small 
Muslim villages inside Christian-dominated provinces and cities. MILF’s petition for full 
jurisdiction over economic and natural resources in these areas required a constitutional 
amendment, which could only be done with the approval of Congress. 
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The negotiating teams from the GRP and MILF, with Malaysia as the facilitator, 
eventually came to a compromise on this issue, which led to the crafting of the 
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). Under this proposed 
agreement, a new political entity called the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) would 
replace ARMM and have an additional 712 barangays.338 The BJE would also have its 
own “basic law, police and internal security force, and system of banking and finance, civil 
service, education and legislative and electoral institutions, as well as full authority to 
develop and dispose of minerals and other natural resources.”339 This proposal was 
announced by representatives of the government panel and MILF in July 2008 and 
scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the following month.340 
The news about the forthcoming MOA-AD was met with strong resistance from 
government officials and constituents in Christian communities in Mindanao. These 
Mindanao-based politicians, particularly two city mayors and one vice governor, 
vehemently opposed inclusion of the BJE and demanded that the negotiating panels 
publish the MOA-AD draft.341 They accused the government panel of doing the 
negotiations in secret and without consulting the affected communities. Subsequently, 
these local leaders filed a petition with the Supreme Court prohibiting the GRP panel 
from signing the MOA-AD until after the publication and public discussion of the draft 
agreement.342 Public opposition in Christian-majority provinces intensified with 
symbolic demonstrations and prayer rallies attended by as many as 10,000 protesters.343 
The day before the scheduled signing in Kuala Lumpur, the Supreme Court issued a 
temporary restraining order based on petitions submitted to prevent the GRP panel from 
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signing the agreement.344 The Supreme Court’s investigations led to a ruling that 
declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional.345 The court cited, among other reasons, that 
there was no consultation process despite the seriousness of the matter to the people; that 
the agreement offset existing laws on indigenous tribes’ rights to ancestral domains; and 
that the proposed BJE’s “associative” relationship with the Philippine republic resembled 
a legal term, which implied a prelude to granting full independence.346 
The judicial ruling not only prevented the signing and implementation of the 
MOA-AD, but also led to renewed hostilities. A few days after the Supreme Court issued 
the restraining order, MILF attacked its neighboring Christian communities in the 
provinces of North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, and Sarangani.347 The ensuing violence 
resulted in a hundred deaths and thousands of displaced families.348 MILF leadership 
denied giving the orders but blamed the delay in the peace agreement as the culprit for the 
impatient behavior of some its field commanders.349 Later on, the Arroyo administration 
announced it was planning to suspend negotiations in light of the atrocities committed by 
rogue MILF elements, and the MOA-AD was never implemented.350 Eventually, the GRP 
panel withdrew and called for a halt in the peace negotiations.351 The Philippine 
government pledged that future negotiations with MILF would only proceed if they 
included all stakeholders.352 Arroyo’s term concluded without achieving any tangible 
outcome from the GRP–MILF negotiations.     
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c. The Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro and the 
Bangsamoro Basic Law 
A brighter prospect in the GRP–MILF peace efforts began under the leadership of 
President Benigno Aquino III in 2010. As part of its urgent security agenda, the new 
administration vowed to peacefully end the conflict with MILF by inking a 
comprehensive agreement within the six-year term of the president. The government 
immediately assembled a new negotiating panel, headed by Marvic Leonon, a dean from 
the University of the Philippines’ College of Law.353 The new leadership also announced 
that Malaysia would continue to act as the facilitator, including the peace mechanisms 
that were established in the previous administration. President Aquino’s sincerity in the 
peace negotiation was highlighted when he made the unprecedented gesture of meeting 
MILF leader Murad Ebrahim, hosted by Japan, where they both agreed to a speedy 
resolution of the conflict.354 One year later, the negotiating parties promulgated and 
signed a 14-page document called the Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB), 
which outlined the general principles on which the end agreement should be based.  
The FAB eventually paved the way for the signing of the final peace pact between 
the GRP and the MILF, known as the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement of the 
Bangsamoro (CAB). The signing of the CAB received accolades from local and 
international observers because of the agreement’s all-inclusive character―a great 
improvement over previously signed accords with the Moros. For one, the CAB 
exemplified the best peace formula in providing adequate measures for the Moros’ 
political demands.355 The agreement also considered the concerns of all other 
stakeholders in Mindanao, such as the mainstream MNLF, the Lumads and other non-
Muslim ethnic tribes, and Christian political leaders and civil-society organizations, 
which had not been consulted in earlier negotiation efforts. Significantly, the CAB 
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provided a more detailed declaration of the terms of the agreement, encompassing the 
general principles outlined in the FAB, and the addition of signed annexes related to 
power sharing, income generation and wealth sharing, and rebel reintegration.356 
The CAB also embodied a win-win compromise between the GRP and MILF. It 
signified MILF’s abandonment of the armed struggle for independence with a guarantee 
of gradually decommissioning its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force 
(BIAF). The GRP in return would establish an expanded and empowered autonomous 
region for the Bangsamoro. This new political entity would replace the existing ARMM, 
which was created under the 1996 GRP–MNLF peace accord, and would be imbued with 
“far greater political and economic powers.”357 The power-sharing aspect was among the 
important components of the settlement, such that out of the 81 state powers identified by 
the parties, 58 were delegated to the Bangsamoro, 14 remained with the national 
government, and 14 were mutually shared.358 This meant that the future Moro 
autonomous region would be given some degree of tax collection authority and a larger 
share of revenue from natural resources and other revenues of the region.359 While a 
number of state powers were devolved for Bangsamoro’s self-rule, the national 
government maintained its authority on “foreign policy, defense and external security, 
monetary policy, and citizenship.”360 
The CAB also stipulated the processes and mechanisms upon which the current 
Muslim autonomous region would transition to the new Bangsamoro political entity. The 
agreement required the creation of a Bangsamoro Transition Committee (BTC), 
comprising members from both the GRP and MILF, who would draft a Bangsamoro 
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Basic Law (BBL) to be passed in the Philippine Congress as an urgent bill.361 The BBL 
would have become the basic law governing the new autonomous region. This organic 
law had included sections on “general provisions, Bangsamoro identity, territory, 
political autonomy, inter-governmental relations, justice system, fiscal autonomy, 
economy and patrimony, natural resources.”362 If the BBL had been enacted into law, a 
plebiscite  would have been held in the proposed Bangsamoro territory for the people to 
decide whether they would join the new autonomous region. If the extent of territories 
had been identified, a MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) would have 
initially served in the Bangsamoro government within the interim period. The BTA 
would have relinquished its position to the winning candidates in the first election 
conducted in the Bangsamoro region.363 This entire process had been set to be 
accomplished within the six-year term of President Aquino, which ended in 2016.      
The CAB did not progress according to its intended and imposed timeline. When 
the BBL was submitted and deliberated in Congress, the Senate Committee on Local 
Governments requested more time to study the proposal in detail because of the many 
controversial provisions found therein.364 The approval process was further delayed 
when the House of Representatives drafted a “substitute bill” that incorporated 28 
“substantial amendments” from the original BBL document.365 The BTC, which drafted 
the BBL, passed a resolution rejecting the substitute bill and demanding the passage of 
the BBL in “its original form.”366 The BTC contended that the proposed revisions were 
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contrary to what was agreed to in the FAB and the CAB and that the substitute bill 
provided even less of the current Muslim autonomous region than the BBL sought to 
replace.367 The Senate further deferred the interpellation of the BBL in January 2016 
after 44 policemen were killed in an operation that neutralized a foreign terrorist leader 
inside the MILF community in Mamasapano, Maguindanao. The incident also claimed 18 
MILF rebels, which increased the suspicion of the rebel group’s collusion with the 
terrorist organization.368 MILF, however, quickly blamed the police for operating inside 
its territories without coordination. The incident put the BBL in jeopardy, with the Senate 
president declaring the “BBL [was] the 45th victim in Mamasapano.”369 The BBL did 
not pass in Congress when President Aquino’s term ended in June 2016; it found a 
reliable sponsor, however, with the latter’s successor, President Rodrigo Duterte. The 
new president is supportive of the BBL, being a Mindanaoan himself, and is also 
advocating “federalism,” which favors the MILF concept of autonomy. With the current 
administration’s mindset, many legislators are expediting the approval of the BBL, which 
will set the precedent of creating a federal form of government.370 
B. THE MILF REINTEGRATION PLAN AND ITS PROSPECTS 
With the brighter prospects of the BBL under the Duterte presidency, the CAB 
and its program for MILF combatants will finally be implemented. Under the GRP–
MILF agreement, the would-be status of the armed wing of MILF is stipulated in the 
CAB’s Normalization Annex. Normalization is essentially the agreement’s disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program; MILF prefers the use of the term 
normalization because DDR’s disarmament has the “negative connotation” of denoting 
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surrender to the central government.371 The theme of the normalization plan is not 
therefore centered on disarmament and demobilization but on programs to build peaceful 
Bangsamoro communities that “achieve their desired quality of life” and “where long-
held traditions and values continue to be honored.”372 To this end, the normalization 
process includes the establishment of transition mechanisms, with the Joint 
Normalization Committee as the main coordinating body; the decommissioning of the 
BIAF, the armed component of MILF, with the objective of ending its use; the 
organization of the Bangsamoro Police Force; and the provision of socio-economic 
programs in Bangsamoro communities.  
The disbanding and reintegration of MILF’s armed elements are stipulated in the 
normalization plan as two important segments: the phased decommissioning program and 
the organization of the Bangsamoro Police Force. The demobilization of the rebels will 
be carried out by the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) that will “oversee the 
process of decommissioning of the MILF forces and their weapons”373 The IDB 
comprises local and foreign experts and is currently headed by Ambassador Haydar Berk 
from Turkey.374 The IDB’s primary functions involve accounting for and confirming 
BIAF members and their weapons, scheduling decommissioning timelines, and 
subsequently disposing of the rebels’ firearms.  
The decommissioning process is unique among civil war settlements around the 
world because the turnover of MILF guns will be done in phases that correspond with 
their attainment of political commitments in the peace agreement.375 The first phase is 
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the inventory of BIAF members and the ceremonial handover of firearms. In the second 
phase, 30 percent of MILF armed elements are slated for decommissioning, but this will 
only take place once the BBL becomes a law and is endorsed through a plebiscite.376 In 
the third and fourth phases, the number of decommissioned BIAF members will reach 65 
percent and 100 percent, respectively, which will also coincide with the establishment of 
the Bangsamoro Police Force and the signing of an exit agreement.377 
As a prelude to this endeavor, MILF turned over the first tranche of its firearms 
on June 2015 in a ceremony administered by the IDB and attended by President Aquino 
in Mindanao. This event, during which the MILF handed over 75 high-caliber weapons, 
also signaled the start of the decommissioning process whereby “145 rebels out of the 
estimated 10,000 BIAF members” have prepared themselves to be incorporated into 
mainstream society.378 For turning over their guns and leaving rebel  life, they were 
given socio-economic and livelihood programs such as educational scholarships or 
assistance for business investments.379 Those who qualified to join the military and 
police were also given assistance in processing their applications.380 Currently, however, 
the succeeding phases of the decommissioning program are still held in abeyance pending 
the passage of the BBL in the Philippine Congress.  
With the projected disbandment of more than 10,000 armed elements of MILF, 
the negotiating panels had to devise viable methods for reintegrating the rebels 
considering the region presently lacks employment and livelihood opportunities. One 
option is the rebel-military integration program—wherein former insurgents are merged 
into the national military. This was done during the 1996 GRP–MNLF peace agreement, 
whereby more than 5,000 Moro rebels were integrated into the Philippine military and 
police units. These former MNLF rebels continue to serve as regular officers and enlisted 
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personnel in the AFP today. Many of them are also currently rendering duties in the 
infantry and engineer battalions stationed in Mindanao.  
MILF, however, came up with a different approach. Instead of integrating its 
armed elements into the military, the MILF aims to create a separate Bangsamoro Police 
Force in the autonomous region. This proposal was ultimately included in the 
Normalization Annex when the CAB was signed in 2014. As stated in the CAB’s 
normalization plan, the new autonomous region will create its own Bangsamoro Police 
Force.381 It will be responsible for enforcing the law and maintaining peace and order in 
the Bangsamoro region.382 The police force will also be under the operational control of 
the chief executive of new political entity.383 With this plan, the central government’s 
Philippine National Police (PNP), currently performing duties inside the region, will 
relinquish its jurisdiction to this separate Bangsamoro Police Force. Furthermore, the 
agreement also clearly specifies that AFP units stationed in the autonomous region, 
which were once at the forefront in the Muslim rebellion, will redeploy outside the region 
when the police force is in place. The AFP will maintain, if necessary, installations 
intended only for external defense.384 To achieve these goals, the Independent 
Commission on Policing (ICP) has been organized and primarily tasked with planning 
and making policy recommendations related to the creation of the Bangsamoro Police 
Force.385 The ICP is currently staffed with three foreign and four local commissioners.386 
The implementation of this program is also presently held in abeyance pending the 
passage of the BBL in the Philippine Congress.  
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The plan for MILF’s decommissioning and reintegration has again come back as a 
contentious issue as the new administration of President Duterte has pushed for the 
passage of the BBL. Presently, there are different views among legislators, peace 
advocates, and experts on this controversial issue. There are groups who vehemently 
oppose the creation of a separate Bangsamoro Police Force and who even describe the 
plan as an “imminent threat and worst nightmare to non-Muslims in Mindanao: the 
MILF’s armed force being legalized as a police force.”387 They add that this set-up is a 
clear violation of the constitution, under which the sovereign state is supposed to have 
“the sole legal monopoly on the use of force.”388 Conversely, the GRP and MNLF peace 
panels contend that the proposed Bangsamoro Police Force is consistent with the 
constitution.389 They argue that it will not operate as a separate entity but will be set up 
like other PNP regional commands in the country.390 The “recruitment, training, 
personnel promotion, firearms procurement,” and other administrative services shall 
remain under the PNP.391 They also deny the allegations that MILF combatants will 
automatically become the Bangsamoro police, citing that they still need to apply and 
qualify individually.392 Despite these differences, the ICP has assured the public that it 
understands that transforming the BIAF into “professional and neutral policemen” will be 
a big challenge. Hence, they will not compromise the trust of the people by allowing any 
member of MILF to be part of the police force without going through the required 
processes. Interestingly, the ICP states it also had conflicting ideas within its committee 
as it crafted policy recommendations.393 The most evident disagreement was on the issue 
of how much authority should be retained by the PNP or assumed by the Bangsamoro 
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Police Force.394 The ICP, therefore, has formulated a guideline that all of its proposals be 
in accordance with the Philippine constitution and the CAB as well as in principle be 
desirable to the Bangsamoro people.395 
Despite that the Bangsamoro Police Force is not yet operational, a number of 
implementation issues have been anticipated. One concern is the existence of 
approximately 6,000 Muslim policemen in the present ARMM.396 These policemen have 
had a bad reputation among the locals, as they allegedly function only as protectors of 
corrupt politicians who helped them get through the police recruitment process 
illegally.397 These existing policemen have posed problems because they sometimes 
resist being transferred to Christian-dominated areas outside the region. Similarly, they 
may also demand to be absorbed into the Bangsamoro Police Force, which could affect 
the noble intentions of the agreement. Another concern is over how to quickly capacitate 
and professionalize the new police force given the prevailing security situation in Muslim 
areas in Mindanao. These security challenges include, among others, the pervasive clan 
wars, or rido, among Muslim families, which have endured for centuries; the existence of 
private armed groups maintained by Muslim warlords, drug lords, and politicians; and the 
presence of MNLF/MILF break-away factions and Islamic terrorist organizations. These 
concerns become even more problematic because of the reported collusion among some 
MILF elements with these armed groups. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of this discussion has 
been to examine the dynamics in the GRP–MILF peace efforts, paying particular 
attention to the rebel reintegration program to determine its prospects as an important 
component of the peace accord. This study observed that the stability of the GRP–MILF 
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peace agreement is largely influenced by three factors: the sincerity of the political 
leaders, the involvement of international actors, and the establishment of peace 
mechanisms throughout the course of the conflict. Each of these factors has a parallel 
impact on the peace agreement’s rebel reintegration programs. The caveat, however, is 
that political leaders impose varying policies that can affect the tempo and direction of 
the peace plan. Nonetheless, the presence of peace mechanisms, along with international 
actors not affected by changes in political leadership, can be the deciding factor in 
attaining a successful peace accord and rebel reintegration program.   
Notably, most of the Philippine presidents, beginning with President Fidel Ramos 
in 1997, had shown their willingness to forge a peaceful settlement with MILF. Each of 
these leaders’ administrations also provided a distinct contribution leading to a more 
stable and comprehensive peace agreement. It was during the Ramos administration that 
the GRP–MILF ceasefire agreement was forged. The cessation of hostilities was the most 
important concession during those times because it opened the doors for the succeeding 
negotiations. It was during President Estrada’s term that peace talks completely stalled as 
he pursued an all-out war with MILF in 2000. Interestingly, the government’s major 
offensives and MILF’s retaliatory attacks were also instrumental in bringing both parties 
back to the negotiating table to come up with a feasible agenda and to accept new 
compromises that would have been hard to achieve before. With all its camps seized by 
government forces, MILF had severely reduced its bargaining power. MILF, however, 
continued its struggle by bombing Christian-dominated urban centers. Both parties had to 
go back to the negotiating table with mounting local and international pressure. Since 
then, MILF has already changed its original demand of secession to full autonomy. The 
notable achievements during the term of President Arroyo included the strengthening of 
peace mechanisms and the deeper involvement of international organs. It was during her 
time that Malaysia was invited as a third-party facilitator and the IMT, AHJAG, and 
CCCH were established. With all the peace mechanisms and international support in 
place, the Aquino administration was able to focus on arriving at a final peace agreement, 
which ultimately resulted in the signing of the CAB in 2014. Now that a comprehensive 
agreement has been signed, the major challenge facing the current administration of 
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Rodrigo Duterte is to pursue the government’s commitment to the CAB. Part of this 
commitment is the implementation of the Normalization Annex, which covers the most 
important aspect of the peace settlement—the demobilization and reintegration of 
MILF’s armed wing.  
Despite its imperfections, the normalization plan offers a distinct but viable 
approach to demobilizing and reintegrating MILF rebels. One important indication is the 
involvement of local and foreign experts in independent oversight committees and the 
establishment of mechanisms that are specifically designed for the implementation of the 
normalization plan. Among these are the creation of the Joint Normalization Committee, 
the Independent Commission on Policing, and the Independent Decommissioning Body. 
These types of neutral organizations were not present in the 1996 GRP–MNLF peace 
agreement, yet rebel integration was successfully implemented. Hence, these may 
significantly improve the implementation of rebel reintegration packages.  
The presence of independent committees and normalization mechanisms may also 
reduce the public’s speculations on the creation of the Bangsamoro Police Force. Most 
external observers, especially the majority Filipino constituents who live outside the 
Muslim region, may have a negative impression of the creation of a Bangsamoro Police 
Force. Some may interpret it as an act of legitimizing MILF rebels as police and, even 
worse, sustaining them with the taxes of the Filipino people. There are also suspicions 
that MILF will rearm itself in the guise of police capacity building until it is able to wage 
another war for secession. With this in mind, the role of these independent committees 
becomes critical in the success of the program.  
Notwithstanding the apprehension toward the establishment of the Bangsamoro 
Police Force, there have already been successful cases of reintegrating former rebels into 
an independent police force as part of civil war settlement. This police integration method 
was successfully implemented in South Africa and Ireland such that reforms in the 
policing structures and arrangements had lasting effects in the countries’ peace and 
development efforts. There have been cases, however, in which rebels reintegrated as 
police forces were misused for the self-interest of their political leaders or employed as 
instruments of repression. Thus, it is important that integrating rebels as a separate police 
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force must involve a comprehensive plan encompassing the recruitment process, 
education, and training.  
On the other hand, the creation of a Bangsamoro Police Force is not only an 
additional source of power and authority for the leaders of the Bangsamoro region. It also 
comes with great responsibility for leaders of the new autonomous entity. They will now 
be accountable for the peace and security of the region. Failure in maintaining a secure 
environment for their people will eventually give the central government the legitimacy 
to intervene in the police structure of the region.   
The Normalization process is indeed a complicated undertaking with a variety of 
challenges. Even with some strong opposition, many still believe that normalization 
requires lengthy discussions, sacrifices, and compromises among the negotiating parties 
whose ultimate aim is to bring peace and unity in Mindanao. While processes of 
demobilization and reintegration may indeed be time-consuming and painstaking, the 
concerted effort between two parties that are united in achieving the common goal of 




The rebel integration plan under the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement of the 
Bangsamoro is an essential element that may shape the outcome in the recent effort to 
bring closure to the last remaining Muslim insurgency, except violence incited by Abu 
Sayaf and other ISIS-Affiliated terrorist group, in the southern Philippines. Studies on 
civil war settlements tend to support the idea that rebel integration is an integral part of 
ending ethno-nationalist insurgencies, such as the MILF case, as indicated by the 
increasing trend of peace agreements settled with an integration program. The cases 
examined in this study provide diverse ways of reintegrating former rebels and reveal key 
factors in the rebel integration program that influenced the outcome of each cases. This 
chapter encapsulates the significant findings in the rebel integration cases covered in this 
research, highlights the prominent themes or variables that set the course of their 
outcomes, makes a concluding statement on the prospects of the Comprehensive 
Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB)’s MILF integration plan, and suggests policy 
interventions for the Philippine government to implement the agreement’s reintegration 
program successfully.  
A. OVERALL OBSERVATION ON CIVIL WAR PEACE AGREEMENTS 
AND REBEL INTEGRATION PROGRAMS 
The literature and case studies examined in this research show that rebel 
integration can be an indispensable piece in prolonging peace in civil war 
settlements―with integration being a form of power-sharing arrangement, which 
addresses the issue of power struggle as a triggering factor in civil wars. Caroline 
Hartzell identifies the struggle of power over a state as the fundamental factor for a state 
entering a civil war.398 With power struggle as a major culprit in civil wars, the idea of 
power sharing is therefore an essential component of a peace agreement. Power-sharing 
variables include the devolution of state powers through autonomy and the sharing of 
military or police power―with rebel integration among the simplest to implement and 
                                                 
398 Caroline A. Hartzell, “Mixed Motives?” 
 88 
most effective forms of power sharing.399 Recently, rebel integration programs have been 
used as part of peace agreements to promote peace and, possibly, to prevent civil war 
from recurring.400 Out of the 128 civil wars between 1945 and 2006, about 40 percent of 
the peace settlements engaged in some form of rebel integration.401 The GRP–MILF 
peace agreement has followed this path of civil war settlement. The parties have willingly 
compromised to share powers, which include among others the promise of autonomy in 
the Muslim region and the integration of rebels through the creation of the Bangsamoro 
Police Force.      
B. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS ON REBEL INTEGRATION CASES AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON THE MILF REINTEGRATION PLAN  
With rebel integration as an important component of the peace agreement, one 
critical question is how MILF integration would be implemented. The broad cases of civil 
war settlements with a rebel integration component examined in Chapter II provide 
important answers to this question. There are three basic methods of integrating rebels 
commonly used in previous conflict settlements: integrating the rebels as troopers in the 
national military, absorbing the rebel leaders into the military hierarchy, and allowing the 
rebels to create units using their own people and leaders, with the units forming part of 
the national military or police organizational structure. This study has shown that each of 
these methods has its own pros and cons, and their applicability depends on the 
distinctive nature of the conflict.  
Out of the three basic rebel integration methods, the CAB adopted the third one, 
which allowed MILF rebels to create their own police force comprising their own men 
and leaders. This approach is distinct from the specific cases undertaken in this study. 
The Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and MNLF cases all embraced a method in which 
former rebels were directly integrated into the national army. Nonetheless, there had 
already been successful reintegration cases in which former rebels were organized as an 
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independent police force. However, these were not specifically covered in this study. For 
example, the civil war settlements in South Africa and Ireland adopted the police 
integration scheme with reforms in the policing structures, which were considered 
successful peace initiatives.  On the other hand, political leaders have been known to 
misuse reintegrated rebels in the police force as instruments of repression. This scheme of 
reintegration, therefore, entails more comprehensive planning to increase its likelihood of 
success. 
Since the MILF’s rebel integration plan is totally different from the MNLF case, 
this scheme has become a very contentious issue in the peace agreement. A number of 
individuals and legal organizations in the Philippines have opposed the implementation 
of this form of rebel integration and described the plan as a violation of the 
constitution.402 They have accused the negotiating panels of legalizing the MILF as a 
police force and thereby posing an imminent threat to non-Muslims in Mindanao.403 
Despite this opposition, the government and MILF peace panel have emphasized that the 
proposed Bangsamoro Police Force is consistent with the constitution; they even argue 
that the police units will operate under the existing organization of the Philippine 
National Police force.404 In contrast to these comparisons, this study has underscored that 
an integration scheme whereby rebels are allowed to create their own military or police 
unit is a viable option for a number of reasons. First, the rebels are used to the leadership 
style of their comrades. Second, this method may eliminate morale issues more 
effectively than the option in which the rebels are inserted in regular military units. Third, 
and most importantly, this arrangement sends a strong message to the rebel group that the 
government is sincere because it is willing to agree to this compromise for the sake of 
lasting peace.  
On the other hand, the establishment of the Bangsamoro Police Force also comes 
with great responsibility for MILF leadership. For one, MILF will now be directly 
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accountable for the peace and security of the region. If it fails to maintain a secure 
environment for its people, the central government can legitimately intervene in the case 
of major lapses in police administration. Hence, it is also important that the GRP 
maintain a strong national military or police force to quell possible abuse resulting from 
the employment of the separate police force.  
The next question is what key variables should be considered to increase the 
likelihood of success in MILF rebel integration. As it emerges in most literature and in 
the cases examined in Chapters I and II, the role of the international community has been 
the most important factor that influences the outcome of rebel integration programs. 
Notably, foreign actors can serve as third-party sponsors in peace treaty planning and 
implementation and can also provide financial support and monitoring. There have been 
cases, however, when involved outside actors did not categorically influence the outcome 
of the rebel integration―such as in Congo, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda. Nevertheless, the 
role of the international community remains a crucial element primarily because it can 
pressure the parties involved to honor the terms of the peace agreement, as in Sierra 
Leone and Bosnia and the case of the MNLF.  
Of the cases considered in this study, the GRP–MNLF peace settlement provides 
a more comprehensive illustration of the important role of the international community. 
Accordingly, it was the Organization of Islamic Conference that pushed the Philippine 
government and the MNLF to peacefully negotiate, and Indonesia’s role as facilitator 
with the support of a number of countries―the United States, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom―led to the signing of the peace accord. These international actors were also 
significantly involved throughout the implementation of the agreement. Notably, during 
the implementation phase, most of the foreign support was directed toward the socio-
economic programs. There was less or even negligible international support in the 
disarmament and reintegration programs, which prevented a full demobilization of the 
MNLF. Meanwhile, the Sierra Leone case showed a higher level of international 
participation. The international community was deeply involved in the negotiations that 
led to the signing of the Lomé agreement. The foreign actors were present during the 
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reform process, which included a rebel integration program. They were also highly 
involved in monitoring the progress of the peace agreement’s implementation to the end. 
The analysis of the case studies in this research suggests that the international 
community is an indispensable partner in forging civil war settlements in most cases, and 
there is a greater chance of success in rebel integration when foreign actors are deeply 
involved from planning to implementation. The GRP–MILF peace accord and its 
Normalization Plan exemplifies these features―there is a higher degree of international 
community participation in almost all aspects of the peace agreement. Notably, the 
negotiations leading to the signing of the CAB were a product of three important 
international organs: Malaysia as the facilitator since 2001; the International Monitoring 
Team, composed of representatives from Malaysia, Libya, Norway, Japan, Indonesia, and 
the EU since 2005; and the International Contact Group (ICG), composed of foreign 
diplomats and NGOs, providing wide-ranging technical expertise and political or 
economic support since 2009.405 This study also finds a higher potential for success in 
the implementation of the rebel integration if both the GRP and MILF commit to the plan 
of entrusting the normalization program to independent organizations composed of local 
and foreign experts. These agencies, which were specifically created for the DDR 
program, include the Joint Normalization Committee, the Independent Decommissioning 
Body, and the Independent Commission on Policing.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
The GRP–MILF conflict fits closely with Kriesberg’s conflict cycle.406 MILF had 
its underlying condition of wanting independence from the Philippines. This condition 
had already manifested when the MNLF was in conflict with the GRP. When the MNLF 
eventually agreed to sign the ARMM, the manifestation of wanting independence, 
escalated to breaking away from the MNLF and continued the armed conflict with the 
GRP. With the influence of the international community, MILF eventually gave in and 
                                                 
405 Mary Ann Arnado, “International Contact Group in Mindanao,” Conciliation Resources, accessed 
October 8, 2017, http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/southeast-asia/international-contact-group-mindanao. 
406 Kriesberg, “Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution,” 342. 
 92 
agreed to have autonomy instead of independence. This led to the signing of the GRP–
MILF peace agreement, which directly relates to the de-escalation phase in Kriesberg’s 
conflict cycle and a step toward the termination phase. The Muslim population in the 
Philippines has been at war for more than 400 years.407 Therefore, the GRP–MILF peace 
agreement should aim to prolong peace for the next 400 years.  
What has this research gleaned from the case studies on military integration and 
its application to the MILF situation? First, rebel integration is an essential form of power 
sharing that is best paired with autonomy in a civil war peace agreement such as in the 
GRP–MILF case. Second the international community plays an important role in conflict 
settlement and a corresponding rebel integration program from inception to 
implementation. Third, the reintegration plan must be simple and must not take too long 
to implement. Based on these lessons, there is a greater probability of success in the 
MILF reintegration plan, as it subscribes to the first two findings. Conversely, its 
impending success may be derailed if it falls short of the third finding―a delay in the 
implementation of the reintegration plan. This thesis therefore recommends that the 
Philippine government reconsider its commitment in the peace process and push for the 
urgent passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in congress. The Philippine legislature 
should set aside political bickering and promptly decide on this important bill, which will 
jumpstart the implementation of the provisions in the GRP–MILF peace agreement. As 
General George Patton famously stated, “A good plan implemented today is better than a 
perfect plan executed tomorrow.”  
The MILF rebel integration plan under the CAB is indeed a complicated 
undertaking, which has varied challenges even before its implementation. Even so, this 
study attests to the fact that the CAB and its provisions are a product of a concerted effort 
between the two parties with the steadfast support from the international community. The 
DDR or the normalization plan under the CAB may not be a perfect proposal, but it 
certainly reflects a number of key elements that are crucial to a potentially successful 
reintegration program. In the end, it is the collaborative effort between two parties 
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committed to achieving the common goal of attaining peace that will guarantee the 
program’s success.  
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